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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
It is difficult nowadays to have a clear and definitive opinion of some
topic. Each response relies on the shadow of the assumptions and
circumstances. In the case of patents there is no difference respect
to this point . The patent system in some situations is a hero and in
other situations is a villain.
The area of patents is a very big research area as the innovation area
is a big one, recently however some topics became hotter than others,
one of this hot points is the explosion of patent litigation in the lasts
decades. Those facts have pointed out the importance of the factors
that drive the patent system as a system that incentive innovation
and as legal framework that protects invention. Some of these factors
are the patent strength and the complexity of the products consumed
nowadays.
This new general technological state in developed economies have
increased the complexity of the measurement of the positive and neg-
ative effects of paten systems. In special in the markets for manufac-
tured products and in the markets for technology. So, the old school
of innovation received new spices as the frequency of terms as prob-
abilistic rights and patent fragmentation became common terms in
the more often legal disputes for property rights (Farrell and Shapiro,
2008).
In this new scenario I consider this thesis as a small tour along the
turbulent and complex universe of effects produced by the patent sys-
tem, so chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to the study of Patent litigation
and chapter 4 evaluates the effects of patents in a dynamic scenario
by using simulations.
The chapter 2 deals with the assessment of different damage rules
(lost profits and unjust enrichment) and the impact of them in welfare
and innovation. In this chapter we compare both damage rules in a
very simple context with a linear demand for an homogeneous prod-
uct, and a patented cost reduction innovation. We allow such patent
be considered not just as an ironclad right also as a probabilistic right.
In chapter 3 we study in more detail the process of patent litiga-
tion incorporating the analysis of settlement as an additional option
of agreement. So we use an earlier model by Aoki and Hu (2003)
that deals with the effects of the legal system on the incentives for
innovation and imitation. This model was developed for a product
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innovation and we extend it to deal with process innovations. A com-
mon knowledge reasonable royalty rate is taken as compensation for
damages instead of the lost profits rule used in Aoki and Hu (2003).
In the same way that the case of a product innovation, we analyse
the impact of the legal system on innovation and welfare when the
innovation to be considered is a cost reduction innovation.
Finally, the chapter 4 explores industrial dynamics and the effects
of patents on a simple artificial industry, for this purpose we use the
technology-performance space developed in Silverberg and Verspa-
gen (2007) together with the basic schumpeterian dynamics of the
Nelson and Winter models.
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L I C E N S I N G P R O B A B I L I S T I C PAT E N T S A N D
L I A B I L I T Y R U L E S
In this chapter, a dynamic game is used to compare licensing of a cost
reduction innovation under lost profits (LP) and unjust enrichment
(UE), both damage rules used by courts in the calculation of damages
when a patent has been infringed.
The novelty property right which belongs to a firm (patent holder)
has a positive probability to be declared invalid in a court. The mar-
ket is composed of two indistinguishable firms that compete in quan-
tities (Cournot).
Licensing by using royalty rates is preferred to that of fixed fees.
However, it is pragmatic to use basic licensing for non-drastic innova-
tions and absolute licensing for radical innovations.
LP is better (in almost all cases) than UE for the industry and soci-
ety. However in most cases consumers are better off under UE and in
LP the patent holder benefits more.
2.1 introduction
One of the most important mechanisms made for compensating and
awarding innovation is the patent system. In this system there is an
authority (i.e. the EPO in Europe) that gives rights of property on
pieces of knowledge to an agent. This rights are known as patents.
Once a patent is granted, the patent holder has the exclusivity
right to exploit the commercial potential of an innovation through
a monopoly, by licensing to others or under other kind of contracts (
i.e. cross licensing).
Economists have been interested in the incentives for licensing for
example, when the inventor gives license to a firm due to an inability
to exploit the commercial potential of the innovation (when its not
a incumbent firm). However, licensing between competitors is not
a uncomplicated decision, i.e in a Bertrand competition license the
the monopoly profit is split, however it is expected that licensing in
markets involve high levels of differentiation
Other topics that have received immense interest for economists is
the contractual mechanism of licensing. Licensing contracts can be
summarized in the groups : i) licensing just by a royalty rate; ii) just
by a fixed fee and iii) a combination of both. The common approach
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has been game theory, in this the patent holder and one or several
players are involved in a game of three stages:
1. at the first stage of the game, the patent holder decides how
much to ask for the licenses and how many licenses he/she will
offer;
2. at the second stage potential licensees decide whether to pur-
chase the license or to use the backstop technology 1;
3. finally in the last stage, firms compete in the market2.
The early literature has assumed that patents are indisputable prop-
erty rights- ironclad property rights. Several authors have compared
fixed fees against royalty rates under different conditions: insider/
outsider inventor and duopolistic/ monopolistic/ perfect competence.
Sen and Tauman (2007) summarize and extend the early models.
They consider a contract where royalties and fixed fees can be in-
cluded together, the innovation is a cost reduction one (drastic or non-
drastic3) and a outsider/incumbent inventor. They conclude that:
1. there is full diffusion of the innovation;
2. consumers are better off, firms are worse off and welfare is im-
proved.
3. the optimal license contract includes a positive royalty rate for
non-drastic innovations.
4. outsider innovator license by a fixed fee just if the market is a
monopoly and the innovation is drastic.
In an ideal world it should be expected that primarily the ideas
that increase the well being of the society should be patented. But
the procedure for to select which ideas are valuable or which are not
valuable it is not perfect and creates some collateral effects, as result
patents could be declared invalid in court procedures.
Lemley and Shapiro (2005) and others have pointed out that half of
all litigated patents are found to be invalid, some of them with con-
siderable commercial importance. In consequence of the high quan-
tity of litigations, nowadays economists have changed the concept of
patent from the ”right to exclude others” to ”the right to sue others
for infringement”.
In practice, when potential users decide to infringe a patent, the
patent holder could enforce the property rights by using the legal
1 The best technology available without the use of the innovation
2 see Kamien and Tauman (2002) and Sen and Tauman (2007) for a survey about
licensing games under ironclad rights
3 In the case of a drastic innovation, the industry becomes a monopoly unless licensing
is allowed.
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system, in this arena the patent holder will try to prove infringement
and the infringer(s) will try to invalid the patent. If the patent holder
is successful in proving infringement, the court could authorize a
compensation or damage payments and could order other actions in
order to enforce the property rights. Commonly two liability rules
are used to calculate damage payments: Lost Profits (LP) and Unjust
Enrichment (UE) 4.
When the inventor is incumbent in the market, damages could be
calculated in different ways, the most common way to do it is using
the LP rule or the UE rule, both rules are based in a profile scenario.
the ”no infringement” scenario. Nevertheless it is more difficult when
the inventor is outside the market because there is not a well defined
profile scenario, because the value of innovations is unknown and
could be estimated by several methods.
By comparing with the base scenario, LP compensate the share of
profit lost by the patent holder caused by the infringement and UE
transfers the competitor’s profit excess to the patent holder. The im-
pacts of this damages have been studied in different contexts as ver-
tical relationship (outside inventor) and horizontal competition (in-
cumbent inventor).
In the case of vertical relationship Schankerman and Scotchmer
(2001) have analyzed how liability rules protect patents, they con-
clude that UE protects the patent holder better than LP in the case
of research tools, however in the case of cost reduction innovations
these results are reverse.
Anton and Yao (2007) explore the impacts of the LP rule on compe-
tence and innovation, assuming a linear demand scheme and a non-
drastic innovation, they conclude that infringement is a dominant
situation even under the use of different liability rules. In the other
fold Choi (2009) compares different liability rules assuming a drastic
innovation and a more general demand function. He concludes that
LP benefits more to the patent holder.
The objective of this paper is to fill the gap left by the recent liter-
ature related to the licensing and liability rules. Firstly, I will try to
compare LP against UE. Secondly I will compare fixed fees against
royalty rates and its relation with damage rules
The starting point of my research is the contribution developed by
Wang (1998), where he develops a duopoly model to study licens-
ing under ironclad patents under a Cournot scenario. In this model
royalty rate scheme is compared against fixed fee licensing for dras-
tic and non-drastic innovations. Under this base model I add the
development made by Anton and Yao and Choi (AYC) to include
probabilistic patents in a take or leave it ex-post5 licensing situation.
4 see Heath et al. (2002) for a complete comparison of damage rules between countries.
5 ex-post innovation or ex-ante trial.
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In a difference of AYC I use a linear demand with homogeneous
firms and homogeneous costs, this specification allow me to study
drastic and non-drastic innovations. Also I compare the royalty rate
scheme against the fixed fee scheme assuming probabilistic patents.
Surprisingly, my results show that licensing is impossible under UE
and just significant innovations are licensed under the LP rule, for an-
other side it is shown that licensing using a royalty rate is better than
a fixed fee scheme from the point of view of the patent holder. Finally,
comparison analysis shows that LP protects the patentee for large in-
novations better, and for small ones the patentee is better protected
by UE.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2 assumptions are
established and it is included a description of the licensing game. In
the sections 3, 4 and 5 the game is solved. In section 6 a comparative
analysis between LP and UE is executed. In section 7 the conclu-
sions and important remarks of this work are analyzed. Proofs of the
propositions are shown in the text and lengthy proofs are treated in
an appendix.
2.2 the game
The game is a non cooperative game that involves two players: patent
holder (firm 1) and a competitor (firm 2), they produce the same
good under fixed marginal costs c, and without loss of generality it
is assumed that c = 0.
Let p = 1− q1− q2 be the inverse linear demand function that both
face, where the subindex 1 is for the patent holder and the subindex
2 is for the competitor.
The firm 1 has patented a cost reduction innovation that reduces
the marginal cost by γ, where 0 < γ.
Let pisi (qi, qj) = (1 + γ − q1 − q2)qi be the profit associated with
the use of the new cost reduction innovation by the firm i and let
piii(qi, qj) = (1− q1 − q2)qi be the profit associated with the use of the
old technology.
At the very beginning of the game the patent holder decides whether
to license (L′) or not (N ′). If decides licensing, he offers a fixed fee
(F) or a royalty rate(r), and the offer is made it in the way take it or
leave it, so if the offer is rejected there is not a new offer.
When the patentee decides to license the innovation by asking by
a royalty rate (r) or a fixed fee (F), after the offer is made it by the
patentee, the competitor chooses one the following three alternatives:
1) accept the offer of the patent holder (L); 2) uses the backstop tech-
nology (N ) and 3) Infringe the patent (I). If there is not a license
offer by the patentee, the competitor just chooses between to use the
backstop technology N ′ or to infringe the patent (I ′) (see Figure 1
below).
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Figure 1.: Game with a royalty rate licensing scheme
Later firms decide the quantities to be offered in the market as
solution of a Cournot game. In the cases that the competitor infringes
the patent the patent holder reacts by starting a process in a court,
with the objective to enforce its property rights. The result of the trial
is unknown, but there is a common knowledge probability θ ∈ (0, 1)
that the patent will be declared valid after the trial, this parameter
also reflects the strength of the patent.
Once the patent holder proves in court the existence of infringe-
ment, the court calculate damage payments, for calculations LP and
UE are considered as estimative of a fair payment. The method that
is going to be used by the court for calculating damages is common
knowledge before trial.
Payoffs are characterized through the actions of the competitor, for
example if the patent holder chooses not to license N ′ and the com-
petitor chooses to use the backstop technology N . Firms will be on
the same situation if the patent holder chooses to license L′ and asks a
royalty rate r and the competitor decides to use the backstop technol-
ogy N ′. Notice that in both situation players should choose the same
quantities, so the payoffs in the terminal stories are the following:
1. piN1 = pi
s
1(q1, q2) and pi
N
2 = pi
i
2(q1, q2), when competitor plays
N .
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2. piL1 = pi
s
1(q1, q2)+ L(q2) and pi
L
2 = pi
s
2(q1, q2)− L(q2), when com-
petitor plays L, notice that L is the license’s revenue (originated
by a fixed fee or a royalty rate).
3. piI1 = pi
s
1(q1, q2) + θD(q1, q2) and pi
I
2 = pi
s
2(q1, q2) − θD(q1, q2),
happens when competitor plays I , where D is the damage pay-
ment.
The solution criterion for the game described above that we are
going to use is the Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), such
solution is developed in the next three sections.
2.3 equilibrium outcomes
2.3.1 Competition Stage
This section is devoted to calculating the equilibrium payoffs under
different scenarios as a solution of the Cournot problem.
Given a defined rule for the calculations of damages (LP or UE),
a level of technology chosen by the incumbent firm (N , I , L) and
a licensing policy defined by the patent holder (to offer or not a li-
cense to the competitor using a fixed fee or a royalty rate), both firms
compete by choosing quantities.
When the competitor decides to use the backstop technology (N ),
the Nash Equilibrium (NE) is granted as
(qN1 , q
N
2 ) =

(
1+2γ
3 ,
1−γ
3
)
if 0 < γ < 1(
1+γ
2 , 0
)
if 1 ≤ γ (1)
As was noted by Arrow (1962) big innovations could permit to the
patent holder to reduce the price till levels below the competitive
prices, this allows the patent holder to dominate the market. These
kind of innovations are called drastic. In this particular setup an inno-
vation is non-drastic if 0 ≤ γ < 1 and is defined drastic if γ ≥ 1, and
then equilibrium payoffs in this case are:
piN1 =

(
1+2γ
3
)2
if 0 < γ < 1(
1+γ
2
)2
if 1 ≤ γ
piN2 =

(
1−γ
3
)2
if 0 < γ < 1
0 if 1 ≤ γ
(2)
A more complex situation emerges when the competitor infringes
the patent (I), once infringement is identified the patent holder will
try to enforce the property rights by suing the incumbent firm. When
the patent holder is successful in court (gains the trial), it is assumed
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here that the court will calculate a damage, payment based in the LP
or UE rule, so profits are:
piI1 = (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q1 + θD(q1, q2)
piI2 = (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q2 − θD(q1, q2)
(3)
Notice that the first term of the r.h.s. in the eq.(3), (1− qi− qj +γ)qi
is the profit gained by the sales and the second term represents the
damage payments θD(q1, q2).
Basically UE and LP both need a comparison scenario of ”no in-
fringement”, here piN1 is used as the comparison value when LP is the
liability rule used by the court, and then under LP, we have that the
damage payments are:6.
DLP = max
{
piN1 − (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q1, 0
}
(4)
When the court uses UE as liability rule, the damage (DUE) is the
excess of profit of the competitor respect to piN2 , then
DUE = max
{
(1− q1 − q2 + γ)q2 − piN2 , 0
}
(5)
The NE when damages are calculated by using the LP rule, and
when the incumbent firm decides to infringe the patent deserves a
special treatment. Given the structure of the damage rules quantities
affect the level of damages, so then, the expected damage affects the
equilibrium quantities.
Lemma 1. The Cournot solution when competitor infringes and court uses
LP rule for calculate damages is,
(qI ,LP1 , q
I ,LP
2 ) =

(
1+2γ
3 ,
1−γ
3
)
if γ < θ3−2θ(
1+γ
3−θ , (1− θ) 1+γ3−θ
)
if γ ≥ θ3−2θ
(6)
, it produces
piI ,LP1 =

(
1+2γ
3
)2
if 0 < γ < θ3−2θ
(1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1+2γ
3
)2
if θ3−2θ ≤ γ < 1
(1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1+γ
2
)2
if γ ≥ 1
piI ,LP2 =

(
1+2γ
3
) (
1−γ
3
)
if 0 < γ < θ3−2θ(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ( 1+2γ3 )2 if θ3−2θ ≤ γ < 1(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ( 1+γ2 )2 if γ ≥ 1
(7)
6 Interested readers could see Anton and Yao (2007) for a more detailed analysis for
non drastic innovation and a more general linear demand.
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When qI ,LP2 = q
N
2 eq. (6), the patent holder gets the same profit
as in the situation of no infringement. However, , the competitor
has an advantageous situation because he enjoys a lower costs and
can produce the same quantity that could have been produced under
no infringement. Anton and Yao (2007) calls this equilibrium Passive
Infringement, because the damage payment does not reflect the effects
of the infringement.
When γ > θ3−2θ damage payments calculated with the lost profit
rule are positive in equilibrium, then in equilibrium a Active Infringe-
ment is present, such situation means that the infringer does not care
about to maintain the profit of the patent holder at the not infringe-
ment’s profit level.
Lemma 2. The Cournot solution when competitor infringes and court uses
UE as liability rule is,
(qI ,UE1 , q
I ,UE
2 ) =
(
(1− θ)1+ γ
3− θ ,
1+ γ
3− θ
)
(8)
Results in the lemmas 1 and 2 cannot be considered trivial, because
the best replies that produces the NEs are non-smooth in both cases.
Proofs of these lemmas are considered in the appendix7.
By using the lemma 2,
piI ,UE1 =

(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ( 1−γ3 )2 if 0 < γ < 1(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
if γ ≥ 1
piI ,UE1 =
(1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1−γ
3
)2
if 0 < γ < 1
(1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
if γ ≥ 1
(9)
When the competitor accepts the offer (L) against a given fixed fee
(F), the following NE is obtained:(
qL,F1 , q
L,F
2
)
=
(
1+ γ
3
,
1+ γ
3
)
(10)
, and when the competitor accepts the offer (L) against a given
royalty rate (r), the following NE is obtained:(
qL,R1 , q
L,R
2
)
=
(
1+ γ+ r
3
,
1+ γ− 2r
3
)
(11)
7 Anton and Yao (2007) prove the lemma 1 and claimed that the lemma 2 is true, in the
appendix I offer the proof for the lemma 2 and an alternative proof for the lemma 1.
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These results produce the following equilibrium payoffs: for the
fixed fee case
piL,F1 =
(
1+γ
3
)2
+ F
piL,F2 =
(
1+γ
3
)2 − F (12)
; and
piL,R1 =
(
1+γ+r
3
)2
+ r 1+γ−2r3
piL,R2 =
(
1+γ−2r
3
)2 (13)
for the royalty rate case.
2.3.2 Competitor’s Technology Stage
By assuming the type of contract offered is known (a royalty rate or
a fixed fee). To solve the game its necessary to analyze the behav-
ior of the competitor in respect to the technology choice, where the
alternatives are:
1. not infringe the patent N (use the backstop technology);
2. infringe the patent I (use the new technology without a permis-
sion of the patent holder);
3. accept to pay for the use of the new technology if a license is
offered L.
Lemma 3. If the courts calculates damages using the LP rule or the UE
piI2 ≥ piN2 .
Lemma 3 says that the competitor always prefers to infringe instead
of using the backstop technology independently of the liability rule8.
Then, it is necessary to just compare the competitor’s payoff under
licensing piL2 against the payoff under infringement piI2 .
Let F be a fixed fee F ≥ 0 such that piL,F2 − piI2 = 0, then
F =
(
1+ γ
3
)2
− piI2 (14)
, notice that if F is negative there is no positive fixed fee that makes
the licensing option as good as infringe for the competitor. In the
appendix is proved that
Lemma 4. FLP ≥ 0 but FUE ≥ 0 just if γ ≥ δ1, where
δ1 =
12− 5θ + θ2 − 2√(3− θ)2(3+ θ)
6− 7θ + θ2
8 This result is also true under other liability rules as lost royalties and for more general
specifications, see AYC.
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For the case of licensing under a royalty rate, let r be a royalty rate
r ≥ 0 that makes piL,R2 − piI2 = 0, then if exists
r =
1+ γ− 3
√
piI2
2
(15)
From eq. 12 and 13:
1. ∂(piL,F2 − piI2 )/∂F < 0;
2. ∂(piL,R2 − piI2 )/∂r < 0
3. piL,F = piL,R > 0 if F = r = 0
4. piL,F and piL,R are bounded.
then so, it is possible to create a one to one function betweenr and F,
in consequence
Lemma 5. F > 0 iff r > 0
by using the lemma 4 and 5, it is establish that
Lemma 6. In the LP case always exist a positive fixed fee F (or royalty rate
r) such that piL,F2 ≥ piI ,LP2 (or piL,R2 ≥ piI ,LP2 ). However in the UE case
the last statement is true just for γ > δ1.
2.3.3 Licensing Stage
In a take it or leave it bargaining, the patent holder will ask for the
fixed fee that makes the competitor indifferent between take the li-
cense or to infringe.
From eq. (12) it is observable that the patent holder will choose the
greater F that allows the competitor to enjoy the same profit whilst
under infringement, so then
F? = F
In the case of the royalty rate from the eq. 13 it is easy to see that
the patent holder gets the maximum level of fees when r = 1+γ2 and
piL,R2 = 0, because r ≤ 1+γ2 , so then, the patent holder will ask
r? = r
as a royalty rate in exchange of a license, summarizing
Lemma 7. When a licensing contract is offered the patent holder will ask for
F? = F (r? = r) when a fixed fee (royalty rate) is asked against the license.
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By using the definition of r (eq. (15)) in the payoff function piL,R1
from eq.(13), the patent holder’s payoff is
piL,R1 =
(
1+ γ
2
)2
− 5
4
piI2 (16)
From eq.((14)), piI2 =
(
1+γ
3
)2− F?, by replacing piI2 in the last equa-
tion produces
piL,R1 =
(
1+ γ
2
)2
− 5
4
[(
1+ γ
3
)2
− F?
]
(17)
and by using eq. (12), produces
piL,R1 − piL,F1 = F?/4 ≥ 0
, summarizing.
Proposition 1. The patent holder will prefer to license using a royalty rate
scheme instead or a fixed fee scheme.
When the patent holder does not offer a license, the competitor
infringes the patent, so then the patent holder has to compare piL1
against piI1 in order to offer or not a license. Then by comparing these
payoffs we get that
Proposition 2. The patent holder will never license under UE. However
under LP a royalty rate’s license is offered if γ > δ2, where
δ2 =
θ(3− 2θ) + 3√(3− θ)2(2− θ)
18− 15θ + 4θ2
.
In the last lemma δ2 is near to 1, meaning that just big innovations
are licensed when courts used the LP rule. This result also coincides
with the result by Choi (2009) when he concludes that the royalty rate
under UE is lower than the one under LP in a general demand case.
Here, in fact when UE is used by the court, there is not royalty
rate in equilibrium, because the royalty rate is not so big to make
the payoff under licensing big enough as the expected payoff under
infringement, for the patent holder.
2.4 lp vs ue
In this section a comparison between LP and UE is made by using
the results of previous sections.
By summarizing,
Lemma 8. When the LP rule is used there are three possible scenarios:
18
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1. passive infringement γ ≤ θ/(3− 2θ);
2. active Infringement γ > θ/(3− 2θ);
3. licensing by a royalty rate γ > δ2, where 0 ≤ θ/(3− 2θ) ≤ δ2 ≤ 1.
However, when UE is used there is no licensing and the competitor in-
fringes the patent in equilibrium.
Then so, the equilibrium payoffs under both regimes are
(
piLPi ,pi
UE
i
)
=

(
piI ,LPi ,pi
I ,UE
i
)
0 ≤ γ < δ2(
piL,R,LPi ,pi
I ,UE
i
)
γ ≥ δ2
where i = 1, 2, in consequence by using eq. 16 and 7 it is easy to
obtain the equilibrium payoffs under the LP regime
piLP1 =

(
1+2γ
3
)2
if 0 < γ ≤ θ/(3− 2θ)
(1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1+2γ
3
)2
if θ/(3− 2θ) ≤ γ < δ2(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54 (( 1+γ3−θ )2 − θ ( 1+2γ3 )2) if δ2 < γ < 1(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54 (( 1+γ3−θ )2 − θ ( 1+γ2 )2) if 1 ≤ γ
piLP2 =

(
1+2γ
3
) (
1−γ
3
)
if 0 < γ ≤ θ/(3− 2θ)(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ( 1+2γ3 )2 if θ/(3− 2θ) < γ < 1(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ( 1+γ2 )2 if 1 ≤ γ
(18)
Because in the case of UE infringement is always present (see Lemma
3), then from eq. (9) the payoffs are
piUE1 =

(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ( 1−γ3 )2 if 0 < γ < 1(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
if 1 ≤ γ
piUE2 =
 (1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1−γ
3
)2
if 0 < γ < 1
(1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
if 1 ≤ γ
(19)
and by comparing these equilibrium payoffs under LP against UE,
is established that
Proposition 3. The patent holder and the industry (competitor) are better
off (is worse off) under LP (UE) for drastic and almost all the non-drastic
innovations.
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Figure 2.: LP against UE: LP  UE in gray; LP ≺ UE in black; and
LP ≈ UE in white
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As is shown in the Figure 2 the patent holder is better off under
LP (gray area) a mirror situation happens with the competitor that is
better off under UE (black area), both situations are often observed
except in a small area.
Schankerman and Scotchmer (2005) said that under LP the com-
petitor is apprehensive about the losses of the patent holder, and in
respect, its output is chosen endogenously to compensate the dam-
ages of the patent holder, so LP turns in a collusive mechanism of
profit transfer.
When the effect on the industry is compared, industry is better
off under UE in the area on passive infringement (black area), the
reason comes from the fact that under passive infringement there are
not transfers from the competitor to the patent holder under LP. This
reduces the possibility to reach a collusive profit for the industry.
However, when active infringement is present both rules produce
the same industry profit. This result coincides with the one found by
Choi (2009) for a general quantity competition. Finally, when the in-
novation is drastic and LP is used there is licensing. This mechanism
seems to be better than the UE damages infringement mechanism for
sharing the surplus of the innovation. In a consequence a inverse
situation is going to be observed by the consumers who are loosing
surplus facing a higher price.(see lemma 4)
When a patent race is considered, the patent holder’s equilibrium
payoff is the reward of the winner and the competitor’s payoff is the
reward of the looser in the patent race, then as consequence of the
proposition 3,
Proposition 4. LP incentives more R&D than UE for drastic and almost
all non-drastic innovations.
In the case of the consumers, as consequence that the demand is
linear, the consumer surplus is (q1 + q2)2/2 = Q2/2. Now, when the
LP rule is used by using eq 6, 11 and lemma 8
QLP =

2+γ
3 if 0 < γ < θ/(3− 2θ)
(2− θ) 1+γ3−θ if θ/(3− 2θ) ≤ γ < δ2
2(1+γ)−r
3 if γ ≥ δ2
, now by using eq (7)
QLP =

2+γ
3 if 0 < γ < θ/(3− 2θ)
(2− θ) 1+γ3−θ if θ/(3− 2θ) ≤ γ < δ2
(1+γ)
3 +
√(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ( 1+2γ3 )2 if δ2 ≤ γ < 1
(1+γ)
3 +
√(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ( 1+γ2 )2 if γ ≥ 1
(20)
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For UE from eq (8)
QUE = (2− θ)1+ γ
3− θ (21)
, so then, by direct comparison between QLP versus QUE , it is es-
tablished that
Proposition 5. The consumers are better off under UE for drastic innova-
tions, but under non-drastic innovations LP is at least as good as UE.
Let SW = Q2/2 + ∑pii be the social welfare, then by using eq
(17),(18),(19) and (20), comparisons shows that
Proposition 6. Under non-drastic innovations LP is at least as good as UE,
for the society, but for drastic innovations society is better off under the LP
(UE) for strong (weak) patents.
When innovations are drastic and LP is used, there is licensing
against a royalty rate. However, when patents are fragile (small θ),
patentees have less power of bargain with , so then, patentees receive
a comparative diminutive royalty rate, which in turn produces a fall
in revenues of the patent holder and the industry (see Figure 2).
2.5 conclusions
Throughout this chapter LP rule is compared against UE rule. As
consequence of propositions 3 and 5 it is concluded that LP should
be preferred. Firstly, because it has a positive impact on R&D and sec-
ondly it has a positive net effect on the society, even being considered
a collusive mechanism.
Damages are a proven importance in determining the licensing
terms and critical for the existence of a licensing contract (fixed fee
or royalty rate). The results show that theres no licensing under UE,
nevertheless, under LP just considerable innovations are licensing.
One implicit assumption of this model is the timing, this model
lives and ends during the litigation time, by making so that injunc-
tions have not been important, then even the results showed here
predict no licensing, it could be possible when injunctions are consid-
ered9.
Some questions remain unsolved, the first one is related to the ob-
jectives of damage rules in deterring infringement. The question in
this direction is: Which new damage rule could deter infringement?,
also an axiomatic point of view could be useful in such way that it
could be important to know which ideal properties must be present
in a damage rule.
9 see Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009) for the study of
licensing when just injunctions are considered.
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One of the problems with non-drastic innovations and lost profits
are the non-smoothness of the payoff function, more work should
be done trying to characterize some smooth approximation to this
functions in a similar way as the approximation made it by Boone
(2001) for characterizing intensity of competition.
Finally it seems important the study of damage rules with more
than two firms as competitors or as innovators, Encaoua and Lefouili
(2009) and Farrell and Shapiro (2008) study weak patents without con-
sider a comparative approach between the different types of damage
rules, such scenario provides many open questions about the collu-
sive behavior of firms under different damage rules.
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P R O C E S S I N N O VAT I O N S , PAT E N T L I T I G AT I O N
A N D T I M E E F F E C T S
In this work we extend the model developed in (Aoki and Hu, 2003)
in order to cover cost reduction innovations, instead of product in-
novations originally developed on that article. The results show that
smaller innovations are more licensable. Regarding the time factors,
infringers like faster innovation. Bigger innovations and longer imita-
tion periods, under some suitable situations, litigation time could sup-
port innovation and discourage infringement. However the patent life
has ambiguous effects and may promote infringement.
3.1 introduction
Patents are, by their own right, an interesting topic of study, in part
because there is no clear conclusion about the balance between the
positive effects (promote innovations) and the negative ones (market
power for example) of having a patent system. However, there are
other points to take into account since nowadays, some of them re-
late to the complexity of patent rights. Such complexities are derived
from the actual development of science and the efficiency of the le-
gal system to determine whether an invention is in fact a nontrivial
improvement of knowledge.
The other dimension is related with the complexity of the actual
technology, i.e. a cell phone needs more than one hundred different
patented technologies. So in many cases a developer of a product
faces several patent holders in order to develop a final product, and
several of those technologies could complement one of the others
(fragmented patents).
The term probabilistic patents has its origins on the possibility
that a patent can be declared invalid in a court. This happens be-
cause the control of the patent office is not absolute and sometimes
that institution endorses patents to innovations that do not fulfill
the requirements to be patented (most commonly inventive step).
Even firms dealing with market competition could hold these weak
patents (patent with high probability to be declared invalid under
litigation)and license its competitors taking together with the other
firms the market prize of the patent (Farrell and Shapiro, 2008).
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There are several studies about patent litigation; the first ones study
their relationship with settlements by using bargaining models. In-
side these models they try several variations of consequences on the
information of probabilistic patents. (Bebchuk, 1984; Meurer, 1989),
in these earlier models the failure to reach agreements are mere con-
sequence of information failures.
Another group of important studies come from Aoki and Hu (1999)
that analyze the effect of the legal system on licensing and litigation,
they characterize the legal system by the strength of patents and le-
gal costs. They conclude that a legal system that induces a monopoly
power incentive research, also they found that longer litigation is bet-
ter for innovator and imitators (Aoki and Hu, 2003); those results
were found for the case of product innovations.
Nevertheless, some analysts think that in the last step, the strength
of a patent comes from a position of the responsible court that in
some cases could be pro patent protection (Bessen and Meurer, 2005).
This proposition has important consequences on markets and social
welfare in the actual system of incentives to innovation and in all sec-
tors and systems related with innovations. Many of these arguments
and results of several years of empirical and theoretical research sum-
marized in Bessen and Meurer (2008), show the importance of the
study of the actual patent litigation policies and its deficiencies in
some cases.
Consequently, there is a gap related to patent litigation and its re-
lationship with innovation, licensing and settlement when the inno-
vation is a process innovation. When an innovation is a process inno-
vation there are several more difficulties, because in the case of prod-
uct innovations markets with two competitors are duopolies with the
same technology or just a monopoly. However in the case of process
innovations, the competitors stay in the market even if they do not
exploit the innovation and have an inferior technology.
In a market with two firms, firm 1 (patentee) and firm 2 (competi-
tor, potential infringer or licensee) this work attempts to explore the
effects of time factors in specific litigation and imitation times on the
licensing, litigation and settlement of process innovations. In this
way we use the base model by Aoki and Hu (2003). However it is
necessary to work on some specific duopoly and simple games, in or-
der to explain what is going to happen in those scenarios that differ
from those that product innovations produce. In the section 3.2 we
solve some static duopoly games that help out to describe a model
that models licensing, imitation, litigation and settlement of a cost
reduction innovation in a one shot Cournot game. Afterwards in the
section 3.3 we describe the main model, that is basically a game in
extensive form. This model is solved by backward induction through-
out the subsections 3.4.1 to 3.4.4. After then we use the results found
in the previous sections and compare these results in the sense of
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social welfare (consumer surplus added to the profits of the firms).
Finally we finish with concise conclusions.
3.2 particular equilibria
It is important before considering our main model, to study some
simple models which are later going to be used in order to extend
the model by Aoki and Hu (2003) and to include process innovations
instead of product innovations. So in this section we solve three sim-
ple duopoly models with linear demands, the setup being as follows:
• There are two firms: firm 1 and firm 2
• firm 1 and firm 2, both produce a homogeneous good and face
an inverse linear demand given by:
p = 1− q1 − q2 (22)
- both firms compete in this markets choosing quantities (Cournout).
• Without loss of generality, we assume that the firms initially
produce under a constant marginal cost of ci = 0;
• The firm 1 obtains a cost reduction innovation of size e ∈ (0, 1),
in this way its marginal cost is now c1 = −e
• Such cost reduction innovation is patented.
• In this way the profit function for the firm i is:
pii(qi, qj) = (1− qi − qj − ci)qi
- where qj represents the offered quantity by the other firm.
3.2.1 Duopoly under same technology
At this case both firms produce goods with the same technology, and
it is important to characterize a situation where an infringer uses the
patented technology without any consequence. By solving the game,
the equilibrium quantities are:
qa1 = q
a
2 =
1+ e
3
(23)
and the equilibrium profits are
pia1 =
(
1+ e
3
)2
pia2 =
(
1+ e
3
)2
(24)
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3.2.2 Duopoly under different technologies
In this case there is no licensing and firms just compete as Cournot
with different costs, so firm 1 enjoys the innovation and firm 2 pro-
duces with the old technology. We are going to use this case when
the potential infringer decides not to infringe and produce under the
inferior technology, so by solving the game we have:
qb1 =
1+ 2e
3
qb2 =
1− e
3
(25)
and the the equilibrium profits under this setup are easily calcu-
lated as
pib1 =
(
1+ 2e
3
)2
pib2 =
(
1− e
3
)2
(26)
3.2.3 Duopoly under the same technology and an expected reasonable roy-
alty rate
We should also consider the cases where there is infringement and a
suit from the patentee, so the quantities chosen by the firms in the
Cournot competition are made under the shadow of damage pay-
ments and injunctions. In this case both firms produce under the
same technology, but in the case of firm 2, it infringes the patented
technology and as consequence, firm 1 sues the other firm. If the
patent is declared valid and infringed, then the infringer (firm 2) has
to pay a reasonable royalty rate τ by each unit sold; the probabil-
ity that the innovation will be declared valid is common knowledge
θ ∈ (0, 1)
So in this case the payoff functions are:
pi1(q1, q2) = (1− q1 − q2 + e)q1 + θτq2 (27)
pi2(q1, q2) = (1− q1 − q2 + e− θτ)q2 (28)
where θτq2 is the expected rent for the firm 1,so in this case the
equilibrium quantities are:
qc1 =
1+ e+ τθ
3
qc2 =
1+ e− 2τθ
3
(29)
and the equilibrium profits are
pic1 =
(
1+ e+ τθ
3
)2
+ θτ
1+ e− 2τθ
3
(30)
pic2 =
(
1+ e− 2τθ
3
)2
(31)
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We assume that τ ∈ (0, 1) and in some cases we also are going to
assume that τ ≤ e
3.3 model
The main model is based in the model of (Aoki and Hu, 2003); that
model studies the effect of time factors on the licensing of a product
innovation. Here we will use the same structure in order to evaluate
the impact of time factors on the imitation and litigation when the
innovation is a process innovation1.
The temporal setting and the description of the game is as follows:
1. At the very beginning firm 1 gets a cost reduction innovation
with a patent life of γ periods, A license is offered to firm 2 in
the form of a ”take or leave it” offer. This offer is a fixed fee F,
firm 2 then has two options: accept the license an produce with
the same technology or reject it. If firm 2 accepts the offer the
game ends and both firms produce under the same technology,
for γ periods .
2. If there is no licensing firm 2 has to decide whether to imitate
the technology or just stay with the old technology. If firm 2 de-
cides not to imitate, then the game ends with a duopoly where
the firms produce under different technologies, for γ periods.
3. If firm 2 decided to imitate, imitation needs an investment of
h and takes α periods. when the imitation is complete, firm 1
can litigate in order to stop infringement or just leave the things
as they are. if the firm 1 decides not to litigate the game ends,
with both firms producing under the same technology. So then
during the period of imitation firms produce under different
technologies and after the γ − α remaining periods, they pro-
duce with the same technology.
4. If litigation is chosen by firm 1, the trial is going to end β pe-
riods after ( where β ≤ γ − α). At the very beginning of the
legal process, firm 1 can offer a settlement by a fixed fee K, this
offer again is a ”take or leave it” offer. If the firm 2 accepts, both
firms end producing under the same technology for the remain
γ− α periods.
5. If there is no settlement, both firms continue producing but un-
der the shadow of a royalty rate τ that should be paid if the
patent is declared valid and infringed. The probability that
this happens is a common knowledge value θ ∈ (0, 1). Also,
if the patent is declared valid and infringed the infringer firm 2
1 In a difference of the model by Aoki and Hu (2003), our model is discrete, also we
do not consider the effect of the temporal discount factor without loss of generality.
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stops using the technology till the end of the life of patent, and
produces under the old technology. Consequence of this legal
process each firm pays a litigation cost by `1 and `2.
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Figure 3.: Game tree of the process
The figure 3 shows the structure of the game, unfortunately the
real game tree should be a lot bigger the one that is shown, even so
we will call the figure 3 as tree of the game, because this graph gives
a good reference of the over all game.
In order to define the values for all cases, we are going to use
our basic results obtained in the last section,and we characterize the
values of payoffs for firm i under scenario k as Vki .
Now we proceed to characterize the payoffs, using the equilibrium
profits of section 3.2, utilizing a finite repeated game2
1. In the case that firm 2 accepts the license, it pays a fixed fee
of F, and both firms produce under the same technology as a
Duopoly during the patent life γ. We have the following pay-
offs:
VA1 = γpi
a
1 + F (32)
VA2 = γpi
a
2 − F (33)
2. In the case where there is no licensing and where firm 2 decides
not to imitate the innovation, we see that firm 1 produces with
the new technology and firm 2 produces with the old technol-
ogy for the γ periods. In consequence payoffs are:
VNI1 = γpi
b
1 (34)
VNI2 = γpi
b
2 (35)
3. If firm 1 decides to imitate and makes it at a cost of h, after
which if firm 1 (patent holder) decides not to litigate, both firms
act as a duopoly with the same costs for the last γ− α periods,
and in the first α periods (time required to imitate) firm 1 has
lower costs than firm 2, so we have the following payoffs:
VNL1 = αpi
b
1 + (γ− α)pia1 (36)
VNL2 = αpi
b
2 + (γ− α)pia2 − h (37)
2 In a finite repeated game the equilibrium in each period is the Nash solution of the
one shot game, so we just multiply the equilibrium profits on section 3.2 in order to
calculate the payoffs
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4. In the case where firm 1 decides to litigate, firm 1 makes a take it
or leave it offer by K. If a settlement is achieved firm 2 produces
under the same costs as firm 1 for the remaining periods, and
pays K to the firm 1, then:
VS1 = αpi
b
1 + (γ− α)pia1 + K (38)
VS2 = αpi
b
2 + (γ− α)pia2 − h− K (39)
5. The most complex case emerges when there is no settlement af-
ter infringement and after both firms have been unable to reach
a licensing accord. So after α periods, both firms produce under
the shadow of expected cost and expected benefits of τq2 for β
periods. With the probability of θ that firm 1 will win, it is go-
ing to produce with lower costs than firm 2 for the remaining
γ − α − β periods; with a probability of (1− θ) both will pro-
duce with the same costs for the remaining γ − α − β periods
and in this case, both firms pay litigation costs by `i each period.
So:
VNS1 =αpi
b
1 + βpi
c
1 + θ(γ− α− β)pib1 + (1− θ)(γ− α− β)pia1 − β`1
(40)
VNS2 =αpi
b
2 + βpi
c
2 + θ(γ− α− β)pib2 + (1− θ)(γ− α− β)pia2
− β`2 − h (41)
3.4 equilibrium of the model
In this section we solve the model by backward induction. First we de-
terminate the equilibrium solution for the fixed fee optimal for settle-
ment, and then with these results, we can explore the optimal choices
of litigation, imitation and licensing recursively.
3.4.1 Settlement
As previously described firm 1 makes a ”take-it-or-leave-it” option
of a fixed fee settlement. If we assume that this fixed fee exists that
value should be enough to compensate the payoff that firms should
receive in the case of no settlement3.
3 ? symbol is used to denote the equilibrium solution.
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The settlement conditions depends of the payoff of firm 2, by as-
suming a take it or leave it offer, K? should be such that makes
VS2
?
= VNS2
?, so:
K? = −βpic2 − θ(γ− α− β)pib2 − (1− θ)(γ− α− β)pia2 + β`2 + (γ− α)pia2
= (θ(γ− α− β) + β)pia2 − θ(γ− α− β)pib2 − βpic2 + β`2
= θ(γ− α− β)(pia2 − pib2) + β(pia2 − pic2) + β`2 ≥ 0
(42)
Now because pia2 ≥ pib2 and pia2 ≥ pic2 (the better situation happens
when firm 2 uses the innovation without paying any fee or royalty),
so K? ≥ 0, it implies that the settlement condition depends only on
the payoff of firm 1. In this case we should note that the equilibrium
payoffs should hold :
VS1
? ≥ VNS1
?
- by developing this condition
αpib1 + (γ− α)pia1 + K? ≥ αpib1 + βpic1 + θ(γ− α− β)pib1+
(1− θ)(γ− α− β)pia1 − β`1
K? ≥ β(pic1 − pia1) + θ(γ− α− β)(pib1 − pia1)− β`1
by using the value of K?
θ(γ− α− β)(pia2 − pib2)+
β(pia2 − pic2) + β`2 ≥ β(pic1 − pia1) + θ(γ− α− β)(pib1 − pia1)− β`1
β(`1 + `2) ≥ β(pic1 + pic2 − pia1 − pia2)+
θ(γ− α− β)(pib1 + pib2 − pia1 − pia2)
- in consequence, the settlement condition is:
∑
i
`i ≥
(
∑
i
pici −∑
i
piai
)
+ θ
(
γ− α
β
− 1
)(
∑
i
pibi −∑
i
piai
)
(43)
Now we have:
∑
i
pici −∑
i
piai =
θτ
9
(1+ e− θτ) ≥ 0 (44)
which is positive.
About the other term we have that
∑
i
pibi −∑
i
piai = −
e
9
(2− 3e) (45)
when the effect of the innovation is lower than 2/3, the term is nega-
tive and is going to be positive where e > 2/3.
With such facts it is easy to get to know the effects of some variables
as the patent life and others on the suitability of litigation using the
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eq. 43 , just some few comments are necessary for the case of θ and τ
and in the other ones the result is direct.
Because
∂∑pici
∂θ
=
τ
9
(1+ e− 2θτ) ≥ 0 (46)
bigger patent strength makes less suitable settlement just for bigger
innovations because the term ∑i pibi −∑i piai in the equation 43 is just
positive for e > 2/3.
About the royalty rate we have that
∂∑pici
∂τ
=
θ
9
(1+ e− 2θτ) ≥ 0 (47)
so more royalty rate is less suitable to have a settlement. These
facts are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. It is more suitable to have settlement when:
1. litigation costs are higher,
2. patent life γ is longer when e < 2/3 and shorter when e > 2/3
3. imitation time α is shorter when e < 2/3 and longer when e > 2/3
4. litigation time β is shorter when e < 2/3 and longer when e > 2/3
5. the patent strength θ is lower if e > 2/3
6. the reasonable rate τ is lower
It is important to see the results of proposition 7, and the effects
that change in relation to the size of the innovation. This is because
when an innovation is substantial, the cumulated profit of both firms
producing under the same technology is lower than the rent when
they produce under different technologies. There is a scenario to have
a settlement accord in order that the patentee has more bargaining
power (because it makes the offer in the take it or leave scheme ), the
patentee will ask for a bigger share in order to settle, and these effects
are amplified by the patent life and decreased by the imitation time
and the litigation time. For the case of smaller innovations (e < 2/3),
the effects are reversed.
Now when there is a settlement, firm 2 pays K? to firm 1, this value
is positive as we saw before, the value of this is:
K? = θ(γ− α− β)(pia2 − pib2) + β(pia2 − pic2) + β`2 (48)
By doing easy calculations we get:
∂K?
∂α
= −θ(pia2 − pib2) ≤ 0
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Because (pia2 − pib2) > 0,this means that if the time for imitation is
longer the settlement should be lower. This happens as a consequence
that the firm has less time to explore the benefits of innovation along
bigger profits, also
∂K?
∂γ
= θ(pia2 − pib2) ≥ 0
by the oppossing reason, so bigger patent lifetime makes the settle-
ment fee bigger. Now, about the effect of litigation time it comes
∂K?
∂β
= −θ(pia2 − pib2) + (pia2 − pic2) + `2
= −4
9
θ
(
e− τ − eτ + θτ2)+ `2
So by trying to characterize an expected royalty rate (or desired), it
should be fair to assume that τ = e, it ends as:
∂K?
∂β
=
4
9
e2(1− θ)θ + `2 ≥ 0 if τ = e (49)
So when the reasonable royalty rate is fair 4 litigation time has a
positive effect on the settlement fee.
As expected
∂K?
∂`2
= β ≥ 0 (50)
, so bigger litigation costs increases the settlement fee.The effect of
the strength of the patent θ on K? is
∂K?
∂θ
= (γ− α− β)(pia2 − pib2)− β
∂pic2
∂θ
≥ 0 (51)
which is positive because
∂pic2
∂θ
≤ 0, in that way innovations with more
strength will be settled with greater settlement fees. Finally about the
effect of the reasonable royalty rate we have that
∂K?
∂τ
= −β∂pi
c
2
∂τ
≥ 0 (52)
this result comes because
∂pic2
∂τ
≤ 0.
In consequence we get the following proposition
Proposition 8.
∂K?
∂α
≤ 0; ∂K
?
∂γ
≥ 0; ∂K
?
∂β
≥ 0 when τ = e; ∂K
?
∂`2
≥ 0;
∂K?
∂θ
≥ 0; ∂K
?
∂τ
≥ 0
This proposition reflects the fact that time factors amplify the im-
pacts of rents difference under the different technologies, that are
more or less in our setup captured by the patentee, in relation to the
legal system (θ, τ, `) these variables improve the bargaining power of
the patentee and in consequence affect the settlement fee.
4 see Farrell and Shapiro (2008) for a discussion of the ratio between e and τ, given
that in some cases it could be possible that τ > e
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3.4.2 Litigation
By solving the game, we back another stage (see figure 3)to the choice
of firm 1 to litigate or not to litigate. At this point we have to consider
the two possible scenarios (Settlement and No Settlement). There is
no Litigation if VNL1
∗
< VS1
∗ when settlement takes place in the next
stage, or VNL1
∗
< VNS1
∗ when there is no settlement in the next stage.
We consider the payoffs of firm 2 equal in equilibrium under both
situations, it is understood the optimal fee is positive (see eq.(48)).
If there is settlement we have:
VS1
∗ −VNL1 ∗ = K? > 0
So we have that
VS1
∗
> VNL1
∗
(53)
Now if there is no settlement in the next stage, it happens because:
VNS1
∗
> VS1
∗
By using the eq. 53 we have
VNS1
∗
> VNL1
∗
(54)
This make us conclude that :
Proposition 9. Litigation is always optimal for firm 1
This result is quite important because it shows that independently
the innovation’s size and the patent strength is always optimal for the
patentee to litigate when infringement happens.
3.4.3 Imitation
Imitation is going to take place if VNI2
?
< VS2
?. This eventually hap-
pens independently of if there is or not settlement. This is because
the settlement fixed fee is such that VS2
?
= VNS2
?, so we can obtain the
imitation condition as VNI2
?
< VS2
?.
By developing this condition, we obtain
αpib2 + (γ− α)pia2 − h− K? > γpib2
G = (γ− α)(pia2 − pib2)− h− K? > 0
It means that the imitation condition is G > 0. By deriving the time
variables we have that:
∂G
∂α
= −(pia2 − pib2)−
∂K?
∂α
= −(1− θ)(pia2 − pib2) < 0 (55)
∂G
∂γ
= (pia2 − pib2)−
∂K?
∂γ
= (1− θ)(pia2 − pib2) > 0 (56)
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∂G
∂β
= −∂K
?
∂β
< 0 if τ = e (57)
Essentially these effects represent the incentives to imitations be-
cause longer patent life, short imitation time and lower litigation time
make the infringement premium greater for the potential infringer
(firm 2), by summarizing:
Proposition 10. There is more suitability to have imitation, when:
1. The imitation time α is lower;
2. The patent life γ is bigger;
3. The litigation time β is lower when τ = e
Also we can take derivatives in respect of the variables that repre-
sent the legal system, so:
∂G
∂θ
= −∂K
?
∂θ
≤ 0 (58)
∂G
∂τ
= −∂K
?
∂τ
≤ 0 (59)
∂G
∂`2
= −∂K
?
∂`2
≤ 0 (60)
If the legal variables have some direction to support the patentee
system (higher patent strength, higher royalty rates, and high cost of
litigation for the infringer). They reduce the feasibility of infringe-
ment, because these directly affect the settlement payment, making it
greater and the premium of infringement is made lower, so:
Proposition 11. There is less suitability to have imitation, when:
1. The patent strength θ is higher;
2. The reasonable royalty rate τ is higher;
3. The litigation cost for the firm 2 `2 is higher.
One aspect that is quite interesting, is to explore at this stage the im-
pact of time effects on the payoffs of patentee and potential infringer.
By starting with the infringer we proceed to calculate the deriva-
tives VS2
∗ 5 with respect to the time variables α, β and γ. It is observed
in figure 3 given that litigation is active, there are two potential sce-
narios: Settlement and No Settlement. It was discussed before if the
equilibrium payoffs for firm 2 are equal, we can have the impacts of
time variables on the incentives to infringe just deriving VS2
∗ respect
to the time variables, so:
∂VS2
∗
∂α
= −(pia2 − pib2)−
∂K?
∂α
= −(1− θ)(pia2 − pib2) < 0 (61)
5 We obtain this equilibrium payoff by replacing the equilibrium values of K? in equa-
tion 38, we act is similar way for the other equilibrium payoffs.
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∂VS2
∗
∂β
= −∂K
∗
∂β
≤ 0 if τ = e (62)
∂VS2
∗
∂γ
= pia2 −
∂K?
∂γ
= pia2 − θ(pia2 − pib2) = (1− θ)pia2 + θpib2 > 0 (63)
Because the impact of the imitation time is negative it is optimal for
the infringer to imitate as fast as possible. One counterintuitive result
is the impact of the patent life, the greater the incentive to infringe, be-
cause it is possible to get greater rents throughout settlement accord
and enjoy the innovation together with the patentee, for a bigger pe-
riod of time. However the impact of the litigation time is negative
when τ = e (fair compensation), because longer periods of litigation
reduce the premium of infringement along the litigation costs that
eventually make the settlement fee greater, as is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 12.
∂VS2
∗
∂α
< 0,
∂VS2
∗
∂β
< 0 if τ = e,
∂VS2
∗
∂γ
> 0
By working in the same way as before, only this time for the paten-
tee, we have to compare the two payoffs under both scenarios: 1)
Settlement and 2) No Settlement.
Then we start deriving the payoff of the patentee in respect of the
imitation time under the first scenario, as
∂VS1
∗
∂α
= pib1 − pia1 +
∂K?
∂α
= pib1 − pia1 − θ(pia2 − pib2) =
1
9
e(2+ 3e− 4θ)
This term in most of the cases is positive, and in particular it is
positive if e > 2/3 (bigger innovations). However, it could be nega-
tive if the innovation is small enough at least e < 2/3 and with very
high patent strength θ >
2+ e
4
> 1/2, so the patentee with bigger
innovations benefit from a longer imitation.
∂VS1
∗
∂β
=
∂K?
∂β
> 0 if τ = e (64)
Litigation time has a direct consequential effect of increasing the
settlement fee that is positive under the suitable assumption that τ =
e, meaning that longer periods of litigation benefit the patentee, when
a fair royalty rate is applied. Finally making the derivatives of the
payoff of patentee respect the patent life we get that:
∂VS1
∗
∂γ
= pia1 +
∂K?
∂γ
= pia1 + θ(pi
a
2 − pib2) > 0 (65)
So this equation shows that in the scenario of a settlement that
longer patent life benefits the patentee, and summarizing the results,
we get the following proposition
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Proposition 13.
∂VS1
∗
∂α
> 0 if e > 2/3 ,
∂VS1
∗
∂β
> 0 if τ = e,
∂VS1
∗
∂γ
> 0
By working under the last scenario ”No Settlement” and making
the calculations of the derivatives, we get that:
∂VNS1
∗
∂α
= (1− θ)(pib1 − pia1) > 0 (66)
∂VNS1
∗
∂γ
= θpib1 + (1− θ)pia1 > 0 (67)
This means that imitation and longer patent life improves the payoff
of the patentee. By calculating the derivative in respect to the litiga-
tion time, we get:
∂VNS1
∗
∂β
= pic1 − θpib1 + (1− θ)pia1 − `1
The first term is
pic1− θpib1 +(1− θ)pia1 =
1
9
(
3e
(
1− eθ2)+ (2+ e)(1− θ) + 2e2 (1− θ2)) > 0
which is positive, then:
if τ = e

∂VNS1
∗
∂β
> 0, if `1 < pic1 − θpib1 + (1− θ)pia1;
∂VNS1
∗
∂β
< 0, if `1 > pic1 − θpib1 + (1− θ)pia1).
(68)
We conclude that longer litigation benefits the patentee under a
fair royalty rate if the litigation costs for the patentee are smaller and
reverting the effect if they are bigger or when there is no settlement.
Proposition 14.
∂VNS1
∗
∂α
> 0,
∂VNS1
∗
∂β
> 0 if `1 < pic1 − θpib1 + (1− θ)pia1,
∂VNS1
∗
∂γ
> 0
We can collate these results as they impact on the incentives to
innovate or to infringement, in the following table:
Imitation time Litigation time Patent Life
Infringement − − if τ = e +
Innovation + if e > 2/3 + if τ = e, and smaller `1 +
Table 1.: Impacts of time variables on infringement and innovation.
We can conclude that the effect of patent life have ambiguous ef-
fects as it supports innovation (making the patentee payoff better
off in all situations ) but also supports infringement (because longer
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patent life make the incentives to infringe greater). The imitation time
as we have seen before, infringers like fast innovation; in the case of
innovators with greater innovation they will prefer slower imitation.
Time of litigations seems to show that it is worse for the infringer in
all cases, and in some cases supports innovation on the probability
that litigation costs for the patentee are diminished.
3.4.4 Licensing
In the study of licensing there are 3 possible scenarios:
1. No imitation
2. Imitation and no settlement
3. Imitation and settlement
But as we saw in equilibrium, the payoff of firm 2 is the same
whether there is settlement or not. For this reason we have two pos-
sible fixed fee values, and three different scenarios for the patentee.
Licensing under not imitation
If we assume the case that the backward solution is consistent with
no imitation, it is certain firm 1 is offered a license fee FNI? that make
VNI2
?
= VA2
? so we have that:
VA2 = γpi
a
2 − FNI? = γpib2 = VNI2
FNI
?
= γ(pia2 − pib2)
FNI
?
=
4
9
e ≥ 0
(69)
Now we should see if licensing under this condition is feasible for
the firm 1,
VA1 −VNI1 =
=γpia1 + F
NI? − γpib1 =
=γ(pia1 − pib1) + γ(pia2 − pib2) =
=γ
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pibi
)
=
γ
9
(2− 3e)e
(70)
When the imitation does not hold , the licensing condition depends
solely upon the size of the cost reduction innovation,
Proposition 15. When no imitate is optimal for the firm 2, there is a positive
optimal fixed fee FNI? if there is licensing, and the licensing condition is e ≤
2/3, meaning that big innovations are never licensed and small innovations
are always licensed. Also it is more suitable to have licensing when the
patent life is longer.
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Licensing under imitation and no settlement
Certainly firm 1 is offered a license fee FI? that makes VA2
?
= VS2
?
=
VNS2
? so we can get this value by developing this equation as:
VA2 = γpi
a
2 − FI? = αpib2 + (γ− α)pia2 − h− K? = VS2
FI
?
= α(pia2 − pib2) + h + K?
FI
?
= α(pia2 − pib2) + h + θ(γ− α− β)(pia2 − pib2) + β(pia2 − pic2) + β`2 ≥ 0
(71)
Now we explore firm 1’s payoffs under licensing VA1 and no licensing,
so the difference is:
H =VA1 −VNS1 =
=γpia1 + F
I? − (αpib1 + βpic1 + θ(γ− α− β)pib1 + (1− θ)(γ− α− β)pia1 − β`1)
=FI
?
+ α(pia1 − pib1) + θ(γ− α− β)(pia1 − pib1) + β(pia1 − pic1) + β`1 =
by using the value of FI
?
from eq.71
=α
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pibi
)
+ θ(γ− α− β)
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pibi
)
+ β
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pici
)
+∑
i
β`i
(72)
Unfortunately this expression is not always positive because the
term
(
∑i piai −∑i pici
)
is negative when τ = e, the other terms being
positive, so when H is positive there is licensing and in other cases
there is no licensing.
If we derive H in order to the time variables we get that:
∂H
∂α
= (1− θ)
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pibi
)
=
(1− θ)
9
(2− 3e)e
∂H
∂γ
= θ
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pibi
)
=
θ
9
(2− 3e)e
So it means in both cases that the impacts are going to depend on the
size of the innovation e, so the impact of greater imitation time and
longer patent life makes a license more suitable in small innovations
and the effect is contrary in a significant innovation.
Litigation time we have that
∂H
∂β
=− θ
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pibi
)
+
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pici
)
+∑
i
`i
− θ
9
(2− 3e)e+
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pici
)
+∑
i
`i
(73)
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Now because we have that
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pici =
1
9
θτ(−1− e+ θτ) < 0
we can say that
∂H
∂β
> 0 if and only if
∑
i
`i > θ
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pibi
)
−
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pici
)
Now in the case of θ we have that
∂H
∂θ
=(γ− α− β)
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pibi
)
− β∑
i
∂pici
∂θ
(γ− α− β)1
9
(2− 3e)e− β1
9
τ(1+ e− 2θτ)
(74)
which is negative for bigger innovations, and finally calculating the
derivative respect τ
∂H
∂τ
=− β∑
i
∂pici
∂τ
− β
9
θ(1+ e− 2θτ) < 0
(75)
Proposition 16. When there is imitation and no settlement as consistent
choices, it is more suitable to have an accord of licensing , when there are:
1. Longer (Smaller) imitation periods and patent life for small (big) inno-
vations
2. Longer litigation periods if litigation costs are high enough
3. Lower patent strength and reasonable royalty rates.
Licensing under imitation and settlement
In this case we consider again the following fixed fee
FI
?
= α(pia2 − pib2) + h + K?
Using the definitions of the payoffs of the patentee we compare
both payoffs in order to get the licensing conditions in this case, so:
VA1 −VS1 =
=γpia1 + F
I? − αpib1 − (γ− α)pia1 − K? =
=α(pia1 + pi
a
2 − pib1 − pib2) + h =
=α
(
∑
i
piai −∑
i
pibi
)
+ h =
α
9
(2− 3e)e+ h
(76)
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Proposition 17. In the scenario where imitation and settlement are opti-
mal choices, smaller innovations are licensed and it is more suitable to have
licensing when the imitation time is longer and the cost of imitation are
higher.
What we see in the last three propositions is:
1. Small innovations are more suitable to be licensed
2. Longer patent life has a limited effect to promote licensing,
eventually just in the case of no imitation or in some cases of
small innovations.
3. Improve the patent strength and reasonable royalty rates (penal-
ties for infringement)in some cases are against licensing, be-
cause improves the situation of the patentee when licensing con-
tracts are bargained.
3.5 welfare analysis
3.5.1 Welfare Analysis of simple games
The welfare indicator we are going to use is the sum of the consumer
surplus plus the sum of profits of the firms, and because the models
are linear, the general form of social welfare is
SW =∑
i
pii +
(
∑
i
qi
)2
2
So in simple cases by using simple substitution of the formulas in the
section 3.2 we have that, the social welfare for the cases: a) Duopoly
under same technology; b) Duopoly under different technologies; c)
Duopoly under same technology but under the shadow of reasonable
royalty rates:
SWa =
4
9
(1+ e)2 (77)
SWb =
1
18
(
8+ 8e+ 11e2
)
(78)
SWc =
1
18
(2+ 2e− θτ)(4+ 4e+ θτ) (79)
Now it should be interesting to compare different situations so we
have that:
SWa − SWb = 1
18
(8− 3e)e (80)
SWa − SWc = 1
18
θτ(2+ 2e+ θτ) (81)
SWc − SWb = 1
18
(
8e− 3e2 − 2θτ − 2eθτ − θ2τ2) (82)
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The first two expressions are positive, but the last one needs an ex-
tra condition. Using the condition τ = e, the three conditions are
positive, so we have:
Proposition 18. SWa > SWb, SWa > SWc and SWb > SWc if τ = e
3.5.2 Welfare Analysis
We are going to have several scenarios, listed below:
1. Ex ante licensing A, in this case
SWA = γSWa (83)
2. No ex ante licensing and no imitation NI, so
SWNI = γSWb (84)
3. No ex ante licensing, imitation, and no settlement NS, so
SWNS =αSWb + βSWc + θ(γ− α− β)SWb+
(1− θ)(γ− α− β)SWa − β∑
i
`i − h (85)
4. No ex ante licensing, imitation, and settlement S, so
SWS = αSWb + (γ− α)SWa − h (86)
By fast comparisons of SWA ≥ SWNI , SWA ≥ SWNS, SWA ≥ SWS,
it means that the better situations happens when there is ex ante
licensing,
Proposition 19. The best situation from the point of view of social welfare
is licensing.
3.6 conclusions
Related with the litigation costs of patents, Bessen and Meurer (2005)
point out that innovations with small rewards at risk (less than one
million of USD) make the median estimate of a half million in to-
tal litigation costs and for median rewards at risk (1-25 million) the
estimated median of legal costs is 2 million, then these results are
compatible with the possibility of firms settling in cases of weak and
small patents that are the cause of the greater legal costs. This fact is
consistent with the opinion and data of some authors that the greater
share of patent disputes settle (see PWC (2014)) , comes as a conse-
quence of the higher legal costs and is consistent with the results of
the model.
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Time factors are relevant in the sense that they amplify the effects of
other variables, such as reasonable royalty rates and patent strength,
but in some cases, time factors have direct effects, as can be shown in
the table 1. Infringers will minimize the imitation time and innova-
tors with significant innovations prefer longer imitation times. Also
under suitable longer litigation times have desirable results in order
to promote innovation and discourage infringement. However the
patent life has an ambiguous effect because it supports innovation as
infringement.
One relevant point is that much of the analysis shows that the legal
system variables i.e. legal costs, patent strength and royalty rates have
important interference on the bargaining power of patentees. So it is
important that the patent strength that represents the probability that
the patentee wins in a patent dispute represents the real meaning of
innovation as a discovery, and its inventor has to receive an incentive
in such a way that continues research.
Some of the results have shown the importance of the size of in-
novation in order to measure the magnitude of several policies. So
we have to consider there should be different economic policies for
different combinations of patent size and patent strength.
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S C H U M P E T E R I A N C O M P E T I T I O N , T E C H N O L O G Y
S PA C E A N D PAT E N T S
Here we have a good produced by N f firms in the market where the
quantities supplied by firms determine the market price and the re-
search policies are fixed. We use the model of Silverberg and Verspa-
gen (2007) as structure for a technology-performance space, a space
with Nc columns on the horizontal axis and without a upper bond to
the vertical axis (performance). In this scenario we evaluate several
combinations of patent breadth and patent life on productivity and
social welfare.
4.1 introduction
One of the most cited book in the economic literature is the one writ-
ten by Nelson and Winter (1982), built on several decades of research
studies of both authors based on the ideas originally developed by
Schumpeter (see Schumpeter (1942) and Schumpeter (1961) ). The re-
sult of such effort were several simple and enlightened evolutionary
models of economies and industries.
The model that we are going to call NW82 developed in Nelson and
Winter (1982, ch. 12), is the most simple of the family, and contains
the basic structure of the modern models in evolutionary economics,
however this model got some criticism oriented to the entry, exit and
behavior of the firms inside the model. So, extensions of the model
were incorporated in a new model called by us as NW84 (see Winter
(1984)), it extends the NW82 model allowing adaptive behavior in the
research policies, allowing also the possibility of entry and exit of
firms from the industry.
The robust structure of the NW84 model was easily modified to ex-
plore the effect of intellectual property protection (see Winter (1993)).
This was the first evolutionary model used in the study of patents on
an evolutionary scenario. The conclusions of Winter in this last paper
was that the patent system does not have positive effects on social
welfare.
However, patents are not merely fixed policies and they could be
strategically used against other firms, by giving considerable advan-
tage to some firms by blocking the development of other firms. There-
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fore, it could be in this sense that firms invest in patents in order to
obtain monopolistic benefits that will be eventually used by the firm
for producing more innovation in order to perpetuate the control on a
market, in consequence a virtuous cycle of innovation and investment
it is created by highly concentrated industries. Valle´e and Yıldızoglu
(2007) explored this point in an evolutionary model, where firms were
able to learn, and where firms were able to use its financial resources
strategically in : i) savings; ii) investments; iii) patenting portfolios
and iv) dividends distribution, with free entry and exit of firms, imi-
tation of other firms and innovation. They show that stronger patent
systems show negative results on social welfare and innovation when
compared with milder patent systems.
Nevertheless behind the simplest way to generate innovation in the
NW models there is a black box, eventually the innovation generation
process is expected to be dominated by a Poisson distribution with
parameters depending on the size of the R&D expenses. Also the line
seems to be the space where this innovations live on. In consequence,
there is no explicit structure about the cumulativeness of the innova-
tion process. It is a quite interesting agenda to discuss and eventually
include this innovation process in the models of the Nelson and Win-
ter’s type.
Recently Verspagen and his coauthors have make several attempts
in order to made a definitive theory of how innovations are discov-
ered and used by firms and industries inside a technology-performance
space (defined as the cartesian product of a technological space and
the performance of innovations, where technological space is con-
ceived as the set of different technologies or techniques, i.e chemistry
processes and mechanical processes could be different elements of a
technological space), In their search they use historical data in order
to observe empirical regularities as: 1) that there is a pattern in the
appearance of radical innovations; 2) innovations are not following
a time-homogeneous Poisson processes and 3) innovations are clus-
tered (Silverberg, 2002). Based on these empirical observations and
theoretical developments about technology (as the natural trajecto-
ries theory (Nelson and Winter, 1977)) they propose a model based on
the theory of percolation, and they present a technology-performance
space as the space where inventions are discovered. Such space in its
simpler form is a half-plane where the bottom line represents differ-
ent technologies sorted by technological proximity, and in the other
dimension of this plane it is representing by the performance of the
innovation. In this scenario a particular innovation is a cell, so innova-
tions are arranged by technological type and performance, by using
percolation each cell was categorized as excluded or not by nature.
Using such model They were able to replicate some empirical regular-
ities related to the innovation (Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005). The
approach called NIP (Nothing is impossible at a price) was also ex-
45
4.1 introduction
plored in Silverberg and Verspagen (2007). In such approach all cells
can be discovered but the difficulty for this discovery is heterogenous.
Such models are in practice successful in order to replicate empirical
regularities and incorporate general theories about innovation.
Based on the model of Silverberg and Verspagen (2007), Goldschlag
(2014) has developed an Agent Based Model, taking the cells in the
technology-performance space as product innovations and using firms
as agents, in such scenario firms obtain temporal monopolistic power
and during this time the firms use its resources to have more explo-
ration throughout R&D on the technology-performance space. Also it
incorporated intellectual protection on the model. He concludes that
a patent system is not good in all cases and there is a considerable
area of parameters where having a patent system makes a positive
difference.
The model developed for Silverberg and Verspagen (2007) is a quite
flexible and understandable model that show the mechanics behind
the discovery of innovations. It is clear that this model can be easily
exploited in the line of:
1. Industry dynamics, by using agent based Modeling (ABM), be-
cause the technological space presented by Silverberg and Verspa-
gen (2007) is a reasonable model that describes the process of
innovation’s discovery;
2. Patents, because intellectual property rights are highly interest-
ing in such setups. Since in such scenarios is possible not only
to experiment with the patent life (length of a patent), also to
evaluate different breadth (size) policies for patents.
We think there is a bigger number of applications in the approach
of Verspagen et. al. maybe the most obvious and intuitive one, it is
to relate this approach with the classical NW’s structure. So we start
describing the model in section 4.2, in this section we discuss the
technology-performance space developed by Silverberg and Verspa-
gen (2007), and the other elements that make the model able to simu-
late also Schumpeteriam competition. In section 4.3 we describe the
simulation protocol and we summarize the parameters used in the
simulation and we describe the results of the simulations throughout
some tests and graphs. Finally in section 4.4 we conclude and discuss
future research.
It is crucial to point out that this work could be considered com-
plement to the one developed independently in Goldschlag (2014),
differing from his model, here firms move based on the principles of
local optimization and experimentation. Also there is highly iteration
between firms, not just in the space of innovations also in the market
of an homogeneous product, from such activities are generated re-
sources for R&D in the technology-performance space.
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4.2 model
In this section , we develop a theoretical model that relates the technology-
performance space construction made by Silverberg, Vespagen and
co-authors (see Silverberg and Verspagen (2007)) and the called schum-
peterian competition based on the Nelson and Winter (NW) models
(see Nelson and Winter (1982)) .
4.2.1 Technology-performance space
The technology-performance space developed in Silverberg and Verspa-
gen (2007) in its simplest version considers a square grid that wraps
horizontally and is unbounded in the north side. In this two dimen-
sional world the horizontal axis represents the different technological
categories (technology space) and the vertical axis measures the per-
formance of a particular invention on the productivity (other option
could be a cost reduction). It is assumed that the elements of the
technology-performance space are sorted by technological connected-
ness.
Each one of the cells aij (located on the ith row and jth column)
on the technology-performance space, can be in one of the following
states:
1. 0 not discovered yet (red)
2. 1 discovered but not viable (yellow)
3. 2 discovered and viable (green)
At the very beginning each innovation starts being not discovered,
once is discovered it could be viable just if this innovation is close
enough to operational innovations (discovered and viable). The fig-
ure 4 shows a particular realization of a technology-performance space,
where the basement of the lattice is discovered and viable (green),
there is a vast area of red cells (not discovered yet) and in the frontier
of both there are innovations that are discovered but are not opera-
tional (viable).
The initial state of the technology-performance space, should at
least contain a cell that is discovered and viable, discoveries are made
by firms as a result of investments in R&D. Each innovation (cell)
has a resistance value αij, it reflects the level of difficulty of being
discovered, every R&D effort erodes the resistance of the cell, when
this resistance is consumed the innovation turns discovered and could
be viable or not.
The resistance value of the innovation located at ith row and jth
column is αij, it is generated from a log normal distribution such that
the mean of the realizations is µr and the standard error is σr.
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Figure 4.: A technology-performance space
Once each αij is generated, the dynamics of the resistance is given
for the following equation
αij,t+1 = αij,t − bω
, where ω ∼ U(0, 1) and b is the R&D effort by the firms.
In addition, each one of this cells has a level of productivity (or cost
reduction efficiency) sw, this number is generated by a combination
of the height ycor of the cell and a realization of a normal distribution
in the following way
sw = A0 + ζh (87)
, where h ∼ N(ycor, 1), A0 is the initial productivity without any
innovation and ζ ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed parameter going to be used for
calibration.
All cells start in the state 0 (undiscovered) except the ones that
correspond to the base, then start at state 2 (discovered and viable).
Once the resistance of a cell has been completely consumed, the cell
turns to state 1 (discovered and not viable), such innovation could
be also be able to turn state 2 (discovered and viable) if the cell is
neighbor to a cell on state 2, the neighborhood considered for such
evaluation is a Moore neighborhood of size 1 (see Figure 5).
4.2.2 Short-run behavior
The behavior in the short run is completely based in the model de-
veloped in Nelson and Winter (1982, chap. 12). So there is a fixed
number of firms N f , each one of them produce a quantity q with the
following production function:
q = AK (88)
where A is a productivity factor and K is the capital of the firm,
based on the last equation, the profit is :
Π = P(A− c)K (89)
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where c is the variable cost of production as a rate of the current
capital, and P is the current market price.
The market price is determinate by the inverse demand function as
follows
P =
{
2, if Q ≤ D/2;
D/Q, if Q > D/2.
(90)
, where Q = ∑ qi is the aggregate quantity of the good.
4.2.3 Innovation and patents
In this model each period the firms make R&D activities by using
a percentage of the liquid profit, for the activities of exploration in
the technology-performance space, so the budget destined for this
activities is given by
B = τΠ (91)
the firm then uses this budget to explore each one of the cells in-
side a Moore neighborhood with the same intensity b for each one
(see eq.(92)), the size of the search neighborhood is r (see figure 5),
eventually bigger values of r not necessarily mean better situation in
terms of exploration of the technology-performance space, because
there is less resources for each cell compared with the situation of
a lower search radius, however the firm could be benefit for bigger
search radius, once the other firms have weaken the resistance of the
surrounding cells.
b =
B
(2r + 1)2
(92)
, when a site has been completely weakened the last firm that ex-
plore the cell claims for the right of the cell, it happens just if the cell
is free and undiscovered, also claims its breadth (the neighborhood of
size φ of undiscovered cells). This right is the patent and its exclusion
to others have a duration of υ periods (patent life).
The required inventive step governs which innovations
are protectable, and the breadth governs how different an-
other product must be to avoid infringement — Scotchmer
(2004, pp. 84)
About the duration of a patent, its definition and use is well known
and very intuitive, however the breadth is a concept that needs a more
detailed explanation. We instead of the product definition pointed
up by Scotchmer (see above), we assume that the breadth of a innova-
tion is immediately translated to a neighborhood in the technology-
performance space.
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Figure 5.: Moore neighborhoods of size 0 and 1
Hence υ denotes how many periods the protection is valid and the
patent breadth φ tells how much extends the right on a neighborhood
in the technology-performance space. The cells that belongs to the
patent breadth of an innovation have to be undiscovered cells (cells on
state 0). The undiscovered cells inside the breath of a patent that are
property of another firm can be discovered, but cannot be exploited
during the life of the patent which the breadth belongs, unless the
patent related belongs to the same firm.
4.2.4 Movement of the firm in the technology-performance space
The place where the firm is determines the current level of produc-
tivity that the firms enjoys, once the firms have completed the explo-
ration process, each one of them can move to another cell, if there is
a movement such process is called innovation when its movement is
to a new discovered cell and is called imitation if the movement is
to a cell discovered for another firm, there is no movement to a cell
protected by property rights of other firm.
It is important also to point out that the firm will just move to a
cell inside its vision of exploration (the neighborhood with radius r).
The cell also has to be in the state 2 (discovered and viable). Lastly,
the firm cannot move to sites protected by property rights owned by
other different firms.
The achievable set of firm is Ω (the set of cells where the firm can
move at the current period). Once Ω is determined (this not empty
set because at least such set can contents cell where the firm is), the
firm will have two kind of movements to an element of Ω:
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1. Move 1: the firm moves to the site with the greater
β =
sw
1+ 0.001 ∗ d
, where d is the distance to the actual point where the firm is,
in this way there is a cost included in the movements, further
movements make β lower. The movement ”Move 1” reflects the
wish of the firm to move to the most productive cell weighted
by distance.
2. Move 2: the firm moves randomly to a random cell inside the set
of achievable sites Ω, this movement exists in order to prevent
that firms stayed in a local maxima.
The choice of the movement is made by chance, so the probability
of the movement 2 is η ∈ (0, 1).
Once the firm has moved inside the technology-performance space,
it takes the productivity sw of the cell where the firm is at its new
productivity level A.
4.2.5 investment and capital update
About the dynamics of the capital, it follows almost explicitly the
specification in Nelson and Winter (1982), so defined the markup as
ρ =
Pt At
c
(93)
and the market share as
s =
qt
Qt
(94)
We can define the ratio of desired investment related to capital as
1.03− 2− s
ρ(2− 2s)
1 and the financial restriction is (1− τ)pi so the in-
vestment rate by unit of capital is
I(ρ, s,pi, 0.03) = max
(
0, min
(
1.03− 2− s
ρ(2− 2s) , (1− τ)pi
))
(95)
the term 0.03 is the depreciation of capital and pi =
Π
K
. Then with
such investment the dynamics of firm’s capital is
Kt+1 = (I(ρ, s,pi, 0.03) + 0.97)Kt (96)
1 see Jonard and Yildizog˘lu (1998) for a detailed example, about how to calculate
conjectures in the case of a duopoly
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4.3 simulations
4.3.1 Simulation Protocol
We implement the model described in the last section in Netlogo (see
figure 6), and we carry on about of 20 runs of 1.000 periods each one,
and after each run we save the results only for the last period. some
relevant statics that we are interested on are :
1. IHH: Inverse Herfindhal Index that represents
2. max A: maximum productivity of the firms
3. P: Current price
4. CS = 47(ln 2− ln P): Consumer surplus
5. FS = ∑pi: Firms’ surplus
6. SW = CS + FS: Social Welfare
The values for parameters used in the simulations are summarized
in the Table 2.
Mean resistance µr = 0.05 Neighborhood radius r = [5, 30]
s.d. resistance σr = 0.12 Patent Life υ = [0, 10, 20]
Initial capital K0 = 0.16 Patent Breadth φ = [0, 5, 10]
Initial productivity A0 = 0.16 Probability of movement 2 η = 0.3
Number of columns Nc = 100 cost of production c = 0.16
Number of firms N f = 32 Demand parameter D = 47
% for exploration τ = 0.2 parameter in sw ζ = 0.002
Table 2.: Simulation parameters
Because we should consider 2 cases for r, 3 cases for υ, and 3 cases
φ, we have 18 combinations, by running each combinations 20 times
gives us a database of 360 observations, our choice of the parameters
where made it in order to keep as near as possible to the parameters
used in Nelson and Winter (1982, chap. 12).
The figure 6 shows a particular run of the model, the results shown
are in general similar as the ones obtained in the Nelson and Winter
model, so the market gradually ends highly concentrated, the price
decreases on time and productivity increases.
The pseudocode2 of a run is as follows:
1. setup: the world is generated; each cell is provided with at-
tributes as resistance, sw, state; N f firms are created, ini-
tialized and located in the world.
2 The complete program is in the Appendix B
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Figure 6.: Results from TechSpaShumpComp.nlogo
2. update-space: update the states of the technology-performance
space, by an analysis of resistance of cells (state 0 to state 1) and
an analysis of the composition of each cell’s neighborhood (state
1 to state 2)
3. market: calculate individual supplies for firms q = A * K; cal-
culate the aggregate supply qtot = ∑ q and calculate the mar-
ket clearing price price = D / qtot; calculate attributes for the
firm as profit, share, rho and update the capital k
4. R&D: for each firm establishes a budget for R&D activities budget;
exerting exploration by eroding the resistance of the neighbor-
ing cells; each firm chooses randomly to execute move1 or move2.
5. for each cell the value of the patent life protected = protected
-1 and patent breadth is generated if should be the case (give a
label to a cell with a patent life)
6. statistics: relevant statistics are calculated as max a, CS, FS,
SoW
7. Procedures 2 till 6 are repeated 1000 times
4.3.2 Simulation Results
Our methodology here is exploratory, we make an descriptive analy-
sis using box plots based on the results of the last period of each run.
3
3 In case of ambiguity, some tests for comparisons should be used. Nonetheless, in
our analysis we did not confront with such situation.
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Figure 7.: Effects of patent life [0, 10, 20] under different radius of
search [5, 30]
We start analyzing the effects of the patent life. So, the figure 7
shows the distributions of different variables under different com-
binations of duration for the patent (zero, ten or twenty periods)
and different radius of search of firms in the technology-performance
space (5 or 30). In a first sight it is evident that when r = 30 the
impact of duration of patents is almost null, however results change
dramatically when the radius of search is r = 5, in such case incre-
ments in the duration of patents just have negative effects; at first
prices become bigger, social welfare also decreases as duration in-
creases. Lastly even the productivity is affected negatively for longer
patent duration
Now when we analyze the consequences of different patent breadth
we cannot say nothing definitive, because the box plots do not show
a clear tendency, it is more under the results of the figure 8 we do
not see any impact, and this results are eventually the same under
different radius of search.
It should be interesting from the point of view of the social welfare
to see if there is some optimal combination of patent policies, by
observing the results in the figure 9, we cannot see clearly that there
is an optimal policy. However there is a worst scenario where patent
life is longer and breadth is bigger. This scenario results in the poorer
results in social welfare, also it seems reasonable that one of the best
policies from the point of view of social welfare do not have a patent
system.
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Figure 8.: Effects of patent breadth [0, 5, 10] under different radius of
search [5, 30].
Figure 9.: Distribution of social welfare of combinations of patent
policies (patent life [0, 10, 20] and patent breadth [0, 5, 10])
under different search radius [5, 30]
Finally, repetition of the same exercise but this time observing the
distribution of the maximum level of productivity, shows a poor per-
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Figure 10.: Distribution of the maximum productivity with combina-
tions of patent policies (patent life [0, 10, 20] and patent
breadth [0, 5, 10]) under different search radius [5, 30]
formance of the patent system in special when the radius of search is
smaller (r = 5).
After we see all the boxplots, we can conclude that there is a better
performance in terms of social welfare and productivity when the ra-
dius of search is bigger. So in this case a good economic policy should
be to not have a patent system and promote the research and devel-
opment in divergent areas, not just concentrate research on a specific
area (which should increase the research radius in the technology-
performance space).
4.4 conclusions
We develop a simple model that encompass several important points
from schumpeterian dynamics and from the technology-performance
space developed Silverberg and Verspagen (2007), in order to analyze
several patent policies related to the patent life and patent breadth.
The main objective of a patent system is to promote innovation,
however our findings show us that the patent system effects are bad
for the social welfare and for the productivity (innovation). When
there is smaller search radius in the technology space the results are
even sharper against the patent system, because longer patent dura-
tion (patent life) and bigger patent breadth, difficult innovative search
when the search radius is small.
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We were not able to find an optimal combination of patent life
and patent breadth that benefits society, contrarily we find that the
worst situation is a society with a stronger patent system. As we
saw in the introduction such results are not new, it more seems to be
almost standard than many researchers express themselves against a
stronger patent system.
There are shortcomings in our simple model, and so more work is
necessary in particular in the development of the entrance and exit of
firms that should be crucial in some highly dynamic scenarios, also
one point that is lost in our analysis here is the learning process of
firms in order to explore the technology-performance space. these
points should be studied with more deepness.
There are also several options to explore, these related to the com-
plexity of products (products are made with several different parts).
One area that have been partially explored, is the complexity devel-
oped by the NK approach (see Chang (2009)). Also, Dosi et al. (2008)
explore several aspects of product quality allied with evolutionary
economic concepts, eventually the model developed here could fol-
low similar lines. Our model could be extended to the case of more
goods (potentially substitutes as cell phones and cameras). So in this
case the innovations discovered in the technology-performance space
should have different impact in the quality and costs of different sub-
stitute goods.
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additional proofs for chapter 2
Proof Lemma 1. The best response function for the patent holder φ1(q2) is the same whether
DLP > 0 or DLP = 0, assuming that q2 ∈ [0, 1+ γ]
φ1(q2) =
1− q2 + γ
2
(97)
Let,
x(q1, q2) = (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q2 − θ max
{
piN1 − (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q1, 0
}
= x1(q1, q2)− θ max{x2(q1, q2), 0}
(98)
be the competitor’s payoff function. If the innovation is drastic piN1 is the monopoly profit,
so then piN1 − (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q1 ≥ 0 for any q1, q2 ≥ 0, then DLP > 0. Assuming a internal
solution
φ2(q1) =
1+ γ− (1+ θ)q1
2
if γ ≥ 1 (99)
When the innovation is non drastic, for a given q1 ∈ [0, 1+ γ). x(q1, q2) reach maximum at
q˜2. 0 < q˜2 < qˆ2 =
1+γ−q1
2 where qˆ2 is the maximum of x1(q1, q2). Then ∂x1(q1, q2)/∂q2 > 0 for
q2 ∈ [0, 1+γ−q12 ).
The best response depends on the sign of x2(q1, q2), this sign could be positive, negative or
zero. ∂x2(q1, 0)/∂q2 = q1 > 0 for any q2, means that if x2(q1, 0) is positive x2(q1, q2) is also
positive, then just it is necessary to see what happens with x2(q1, q2) when x2(q1, 0) < 0 . Let
qa,b1 =
(1+ γ)±
√
(1+ γ)2 − 4piN1
2
=
(1+ γ)
2
±
√(
1+ γ
2
)2
−
(
1+ 2γ
3
)2
such that x2(qa1, 0) = x2(q
a
1, 0) = 0, where the upper index a refers to the inferior value and
b to the superior one.
Notice that for a given q1, x2(q1, 0) reach minimum at qc1 =
(1+γ)
2 , for γ < 1 it holds that
0 < qa1 < q
N
1 < q
c
1 < q
b
1 < 1+ γ (100)
Then by the convexity of x2(q1, 0), x2(q1, 0) > 0 for q1 ∈ (0, qa1)∪ (qb1, 1+ γ), and x2(q1, 0) ≤
0 when q1 ∈ [qa1, qb1].
Now when q1 ∈ [qa1, qb1], x2(q1, 0) ≤ 0, then let qa2 be such that x2(q1, qa2) = 0 for q1 ∈ [qa1, qb1],
then
qa2 = (1+ γ)− q1 − piN1 /q1
≥ (1+ γ)− qb1 − piN1 /qa1 = 0
(101)
, in consequence 0 ≤ qa2 < 1 + γ. Now by evaluating the directional derivative in the
direction (0, 1) of x at (q1, qa2), ∂
+x/∂q2(q1, qa2) = 1+ γ− 2qa2 − q1 − θq1,
φ2(q1) =
{
qa2 if q1 ∈ A
1+γ−(1+θ)q1
2 if q1 ∈ B
(102)
where
A =
{
(γ, q1) : q1 ∈ [qa1, qb1],γ < 1, 1+ γ− 2qa2 − q1 − θq1 ≤ 0
}
and
B =
{
(γ, q1) : q1 ∈ [qa1, qb1],γ < 1, 1+ γ− 2qa2 − q1 − θq1 > 0
}
.
In the cases when given a q1, x2(q1, 0) > 0 or q1 ∈ B, the equilibrium has a positive damage
and the the Nash Equilibrium (NE) by eq. (22), (23) and (27) is
(
1+γ
3−θ , (1− θ) 1+γ3−θ
)
. However,
when q1 ∈ A x2 ≤ 0, by using eq(26) with φ1(qa2) instead of q1, qa2 = qN2 , so then by (22)
φ1(qN2 ) = qN1 . By using the restriction 1+ γ− 2qa2 − q1 − θq1 > 0 with the equilibrium quanti-
ties, this condition becomes in γ < θ/(3− 2θ), then when it holds by using eq. (27) the NE is(
qN1 , q
N
2
)
=
(
1+2γ
3 ,
1−γ
3
)
. So then, when γ > θ/(3− 2θ), x2 ≥ 0, and the Nash equilibrium is(
1+γ
3−θ , (1− θ) 1+γ3−θ
)
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Proof Lemma 2. There is a symmetry respect to last proof, this time φ2(q1) is the same whether
DUE > 0 or DUE = 0, when q1 ∈ [0, 1+ γ] is
φ2(q1) =
1− q1 + γ
2
and 0 if q1 > 1+ γ.
Let,
y(q1, q2) = (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q1 + θ max
{
(1− q1 − q2 + γ)q2 − piN2 , 0
}
= y1(q1, q2) + θ max{y2(q1, q2), 0}
be the payoff of the patent holder. If the innovation is drastic piN2 = 0 , then
φ1(q2) =
1+ γ− (1+ θ)q2
2
if γ ≥ 1 and q2 ∈ [0, 1+ γ)
When the innovation is non drastic, for a given q2 ∈ [0, 1 + γ), y(q1, q2) reach maximum
at q˜1, where 0 < q˜1 < qˆ1 = (1 + γ − q2)/2 and qˆ1 is the maximum of y1(q1, q2). Then
∂y1(q1, q2)/∂q1 > 0 for q1 ∈ [0, (1+ γ− q2)/2) and ∂y2(q1, q2)/∂q1 = −q2 for any q1.
The best response depends on the sign of y2(0, q2), this sign could be positive, negative or
zero. There are two values of q2 that make y2(0, q2) = 0,
qa,b2 =
(1+ γ)±
√
(1+ γ)2 − 4piN2
2
=
(1+ γ)
2
±
√(
1+ γ
2
)2
−
(
1− γ
3
)2
where the upper index a refers to the inferior value and b to the superior one. y2(0, q2) reach
maximum at qc2 =
(1+γ)
2 , in a consequence
0 < qa2 < q
c
2 < q
b
2 < 1+ γ
.
By concavity of y2(0, q2), y2(0, q2) < 0 for q1 ∈ (0, qa2) ∪ (qb2, 1 + γ) and y2(0, q2) ≥ 0 when
q2 ∈ [qa2, qb2], then
φ1(q2) =
1+ γ− q2
2
if q2 ∈ (0, qa2) ∪ (qb2, 1+ γ)
.
If it assumed that q2 ∈ (0, qa2)∪ (qb2, 1+ γ) then the best response of patent holder is 1+γ−q22 ,
then the equilibrium is q1 = q2 = (1+ γ)/3, but (1+ γ)/3 ∈ [qa2, qb2] then this is not a NE.
By assuming that q2 ∈ [qa2, qb2] there is
qa1 = (1+ γ)− q2 − piN2 /q2
≥ (1+ γ)− qb2 − piN1 /qa2 = 0
that makes y2(qa1, q2) = 0, where 0 ≤ qa2 < 1+ γ. By analyzing the derivative on the left (or in
direction (−1, 0)) at qa1 ,∂−y/∂q1(qa1, q2) = −(1+ γ− 2qa1 − q2 − θq2), it is bobtained that
φ2(q1) =
{
qa1 if ∂
−y/∂q1(qa1, q2) ≤ 0
1+γ−(1+θ)q1
2 if ∂
−y/∂q1(qa1, q2) > 0
(103)
If is assumed that ∂−y/∂q1(qa1, q2) > 0 the NE is
(
1+γ
3−θ , (1− θ) 1+γ3−θ
)
and it holds that
∂−y/∂q1
(
qa1, (1− θ) 1+γ3−θ
)
> 0.
Finally, if ∂−y/∂q1(qa1, q2) ≤ 0 in equilibrium, qa2(φ1) = (1+ 5γ)/3, so then φ2((1+ 5γ)/3) =
qN2 and the condition ∂−y/∂q1(qa1, q2) ≤ 0 becomes in −(1− 2γ)/3+ (1+ θ)(1− γ)/3 ≤ 0, but
the first term is always positive. then the unique NE is
(
1+γ
3−θ , (1− θ) 1+γ3−θ
)
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Proof Lemma 3. When γ ≤ θ/(3 − 2θ), piI ,LP2 =
(
1+2γ
3
) (
1−γ
3
)
>
(
1−γ
3
)2
= piN2 . When
θ/(3− 2θ) ≤ γ < 1, G(γ, θ) = piI ,LP2 − piN2 , then G =
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ( 1+2γ3 )2 − ( 1−γ3 )2 , now
notice that G11 =
(
1
3−θ
)2 − 4θ+19 , because at θ = 0 G11 = 0 and because dG11/dθ = 2(3−
θ)−3 − 4/9 < (2)−2 − 4/9 < 0, G11 < 0 for θ ∈ (0, 1), then G is concave in γ for θ ∈ (0, 1).
G(1, θ) =
( 2
3−θ
)2 − θ, moreover G2(1, θ) = 8(3− θ)−3 − 1 < 0 for θ ∈ (0, 1), G(1, 0) = ( 23 )2
and G(1, 1) = 0 then by continuity G(1, θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (0, 1).
G(θ/(3− 2θ), θ) =
(
1
3− 2θ
)2
− θ
(
1
3− 2θ
)2
−
(
1− θ
3− 2θ
)2
=
θ(1− θ)
(3− 2θ)2 > 0
because G is concave in γ and G(θ/(3− 2θ), θ), G(1, θ) > 0, G > 0 for γ > θ/(3− 2θ) and
θ ∈ (0, 1). Also, when γ > 1, piI ,LP2 ≥ piN2 = 0.
For the UE case, if γ < 1 piI ,UE2 = (1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1−γ
3
)2
>
(
1−γ
3
)2
= piN2 and in the
case γ > 1, piI ,UE2 ≥ piN2 = 0
Proof Lemma 4. By using (14),
FLP =

(
1+γ
3
)2 − ( 1+2γ3 ) ( 1−γ3 ) if 0 < γ ≤ θ3−2θ(
1+γ
3
)2 − ( 1+γ3−θ )2 + θ ( 1+2γ3 )2 if θ3−2θ < γ < 1(
1+γ
3
)2 − ( 1+γ3−θ )2 + θ ( 1+γ2 )2 if 1 ≤ γ
(104)
and after some algebra
FLP =

1
9γ(1+ 3γ) > 0 if 0 < γ ≤ θ3−2θ
θ(3−5θ+θ2+γ2(30−23θ+4θ2)+γ(24−22θ+4θ2))
9(3−θ)2 if
θ
3−2θ < γ < 1
(1+γ)2θ(57−50θ+9θ2)
36(3−θ)2 > 0 if 1 ≤ γ
it is straightforward to see that the first and third term are positive, in the case of the second
term. Notice that ∂FLP/∂γ = θ(24−22θ+4θ
2+2γ(30−23θ+4θ2))
9(3−θ)2 > 0, F
LP at γ = θ/(3 − 2θ) is
θ(3+θ)
9(3−2θ)2 > 0, then the second term is also positive.
Now in the case of UE,
FUE =

(
1+γ
3
)2 − (1− θ) ( 1+γ3−θ )2 − θ ( 1−γ3 )2 if 0 < γ < 1(
1+γ
3
)2 − (1− θ) ( 1+γ3−θ )2 if 1 ≤ γ (105)
and after some algebra
FUE =
−
θ(6−7θ+θ2+γ2(6−7θ+θ2)−2γ(12−5θ+θ2))
9(3−θ)2 if 0 < γ < 1
(1+γ)2θ(3+θ)
9(3−θ)2 > 0 if 1 ≤ γ
(106)
the first term is not always positive, taking the roots of the polynomial, it is observable that
the expression is greater than zero when γ > 12−5θ+θ2−2
√
27−9θ−3θ2+θ3
6−7θ+θ2 . Finally, the last case is
positive.
Proof Proposition 2. from (16) piL,R1 =
(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54piI2
piL,R,LP1 =

(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54 ( 1+2γ3−θ ) ( 1−γ3 ) if 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2θ(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54 (( 1+γ3−θ )2 − θ ( 1+2γ3 )2) if θ3−2θ ≤ γ < 1(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54 (( 1+γ3−θ )2 − θ ( 1+γ2 )2) if γ ≥ 1
then after some algebra
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piL,R,LP1 − piI ,LP1 =
=

− (1−γ)(5θ+γ(9+7θ))36(3−θ)2 < 0 if 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2θ
θ(−9+3θ+θ2+2γθ(−3+2θ)+γ2(18−15θ+4θ2))
36(3−θ)2 if
θ
3−2θ ≤ γ < 1
(1+γ)2(1−θ)2θ
16(3−θ)2 > 0 if γ ≥ 1
it is observable that the first term is negative and the third one is positive. Let H(θ,γ) =
piL,R,LP1 − piI ,LP1 , where θ3−2θ ≤ γ < 1 , so then, H(θ, θ3−2θ ) = − (1−θ)θ4(3−2θ)2 < 0, H(θ, 1) =
(1−θ)2θ
4(3−θ)2 > 0 and ∂H(θ,γ)/∂γ =
θ(−θ(3−2θ)+γ(18−15θ+4θ2))
18(3−θ)2 >
θ2
54−54θ+12θ2 > 0, then H(θ,γ) ≥ 0
if γ > γs, where γs = θ(3−2θ)+3
√
(3−θ)2(2−θ)
18−15θ+4θ2 is a root of H(θ,γ) = 0.
For the case of UE by preceding as in the LP case,
piL,R,UE1 =

(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54 ((1− θ) ( 1+γ3−θ )2 + θ ( 1−γ3 )2) if 0 ≤ γ < 1(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54 ((1− θ) ( 1+γ3−θ )2) if γ ≥ 1
then after some algebra and using the definition of piI ,UE1
piL,R,UE1 − piI ,UE1 =
−
θ(18−15θ+θ2−2γθ(3+θ)+γ2(18−15θ+θ2))
36(3−θ)2 if 0 ≤ γ < 1
− (1+γ)2(1−θ)θ4(3−θ)2 < 0 if γ ≥ 1
The second term is negative, In the case of the first term, let H(θ,γ) = 18 − 15θ + θ2 −
2γθ(3 + θ) + γ2
(
18− 15θ + θ2), where γ ∈ (0, 1), so then, H(0,γ) = 18 (1+ γ2), H(1,γ) =
4(−1+ γ)2 and ∂H(θ,γ)/∂θ = −15+ 2θ + γ2(−15+ 2θ)− 2γ(3+ 2θ) < 0. Then H(θ,γ) > 0,
piL,R,UE1 − piI ,UE1 = − H(θ,γ)36(3−θ)2 < 0.
Proof Proposition 3. After some algebra,
piLP1 − piUE1 =

θ(3−5θ+θ2)−2γ(−9+21θ−8θ2+θ3)+γ2(27−15θ−2θ2+θ3)
9(3−θ)2 if 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2θ
θ(9−12θ+2γ(−6+θ)θ+2θ2+γ2(36−30θ+5θ2))
9(3−θ)2 if
θ
3−2θ ≤ γ < δ2
θ(2γθ(−9+2θ)+3(3−5θ+θ2)+γ2(54−45θ+8θ2))
12(3−θ)2 if δ2 ≤ γ < 1
(1+γ)2θ(21−26θ+5θ2)
16(3−θ)2 if γ ≥ 1
Let be H(θ,γ) = θ
(
3− 5θ + θ2)− 2γ (−9+ 21θ − 8θ2 + θ3)+γ2 (27− 15θ − 2θ2 + θ3), where
δ2 ≤ γ < 1. H(θ,γ) = 0 has two roots γa,b = −9+21θ−8θ
2+θ3±3
√
9−51θ+85θ2−50θ3+12θ4−θ5
27−15θ−2θ2+θ3 . At Fig-
ure 3 are drawn both roots, It is observable that the behavior of the roots is not continuous
because there are some θ that make the 9− 51θ+ 85θ2 − 50θ3 + 12θ4 − θ5 negative (see dashed
line), then there are no roots for this area. The graph is shaded when 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2θ , γa,b divide
this area in two parts, at the first one H(θ,γ) > 0 and in the second one H(θ,γ) < 0, explicitly
piLP1 − piUE1 ≥ 0 when γ ≤ γa or when γ ≤ γb and piLP1 − piUE1 < 0 in another case.
Let H(θ,γ) = 2γθ(−9 + 2θ) + 3 (3− 5θ + θ2)+ γ2 (54− 45θ + 8θ2), where θ3−2θ ≤ γ < 1,
because H(θ, θ3−2θ ) =
9(3−4θ+θ2)2
(3−2θ)2 > 0, H(θ, 1) = 9
(
5− 6θ + θ2) > 0 and ∂H(θ,γ)/∂γ =
2
(
(−6+ θ)θ + γ (36− 30θ + 5θ2)) > 6θ(6−5θ+θ2)3−2θ > 0. Then piLP1 − piUE1 > 0 for θ3−2θ ≤ γ < δ2
Let H(θ,γ) = 9− 12θ + 2γ(−6 + θ)θ + 2θ2 + γ2 (36− 30θ + 5θ2), where θ3−2θ ≤ γ < 1, be-
cause H(θ, θ3−2θ ) =
3(−3+θ)2(3−7θ+4θ2)
(3−2θ)2 > 0, H(θ, 1) = 63− 78θ + 15θ2 > 0 and ∂H(θ,γ)/∂γ =
2
(
θ(−9+ 2θ) + γ (54− 45θ + 8θ2)) > 2 (θ(−9+ 2θ) + θ3−2∗θ (54− 45θ + 8θ2)) > 2θ(27−21θ+4θ2)3−2θ >
0. Then piLP1 − piUE1 > 0 for δ2 ≤ γ < 1. By direct observation piLP1 − piUE1 > 0 for γ > 1
In the case of the competitor, after some algebra
piLP2 − piUE2 =

− θ(6−7θ+θ
2)+γ(9−30θ+11θ2−2θ3)+γ2(27−12θ−4θ2+θ3)
9(−3+θ)2 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ
− θ(9−12θ+2γ(−6+θ)θ+2θ
2+γ2(36−30θ+5θ2))
9(−3+θ)2
θ
3−2∗θ ≤ γ < 1
− (1+γ)2(−6+θ)θ29(−3+θ)2 γ ≥ 1
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Figure 11.: Roots of piLP1 − piUE1 = 0 for 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2θ
in the last case is easy to see that the expression is positive, in the second case both roots are
under θ/(3− 2θ) and the expression is negative at θ = γ = 1/2, finally in the first case both
roots are inside the region of interest then after some analysis is straightforward to see that
piLP1 − piUE1 > 0 if θ > −9+30θ−11θ
2+2θ3−3
√
9−132θ+238θ2−116θ3+17θ4
2(27−12θ−4θ2+θ3) .
In the case of the industry
∑piLPi −∑piUEi =

θ(−3+2θ)+γ2θ(−3+2θ)+γ(9−12θ+5θ2)
9(−3+θ)2 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ
0 θ3−2∗θ ≤ γ < δ2
θ(−9+3θ+θ2+2γθ(−3+2θ)+γ2(18−15θ+4θ2))
36(−3+θ)2 δ2 ≤ γ < 1
(1+γ)2θ(189−138θ+29θ2)
144(−3+θ)2 γ ≥ 1
In the first case both roots are outside the region of study and at θ = 1/2,γ = 1/10 the
expression is negative, then ∑piLPi − ∑piUEi < 0 if 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ , the third case follows by
notice that one of the roots is δ2 (the other one is negative) and at θ = 1/10,γ = 9/10 the
expression is positive, then ∑piLPi − ∑piUEi > 0 if θ3−2∗θ ≤ γ < δ2, and the last case follows
directly.
Proof Proposition 4. after some algebra
QLP −QUE =

θ−γ(3−2θ)
3(3−θ) 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ
0 θ3−2∗θ ≤ γ < δ2
− (1+γ)(−3+2θ)3(−3+θ) +
√(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ∗ ( 1+2∗γ3 )2 δ2 ≤ γ < 1
− (1+γ)(−3+2θ)3(−3+θ) +
√(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ∗ ( 1+γ2 )2 γ ≥ 1
in the case when 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ , it is observable that ∂(QLP − QUE )/∂γ < 0 and at
γ = θ3−2∗θ Q
LP −QUE = 0, then QLP −QUE > 0 for 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ . In the third case, because
both roots of the polynomial are below δ2 then the term is positive or negative, because at
θ = 1/10,γ = 9/10 the expression is negative, by noticing that if the third term is negative this
implies that the fourth it is also negative, then QLP −QUE > 0 for γ ≥ δ2.
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netlogo’s program used in chapter 4
globals[
;D demand parameter
par ;; parameters for the logN distr.
current -row ;; list of current row patches
qtot ;; total supply
HH ;; Inverse Herfindahl Index
price ;; price of market
ave_a
max_a
min_a
max_profit
ave_profit
CS
FS
SocW
]
breed[firms firm]
firms -own[
A ;; productivity
K ;; capital
q ;; quantity produced
profit ;; profit
rho ;; markup
share ;; market share
]
patches -own[
res ;; resistance
w ;; marginal productivity
state ;; initially all are in state 0 undiscovered
sw ;; productivity of the site
protected ;; periods left for patent protection
]
;; function that returns parameters
;; in LogNormal distribution
;; for make the mean and standard distribution
;; as asked
to-report Mulog [mu sigma]
let beta ln (1 + (sigma ^ 2) / (mu ^ 2))
let M (ln mu) - (beta / 2)
let S sqrt beta
report (list M S)
end
to setup
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ca ;; clear all
reset -ticks
;; give resistance , colors and productivities
;; to each site
give -characteristics
;; create firms
initialize -firms
end
to go
update -space
market
RD
ifelse random -float 1 < (1 - prob_r) [move1][ move2]
ask patches[
if protected > 0 [set protected protected - 1]
if protected = 0 [set plabel ""]
]
statistics
tick
if ticks > nperiods [stop]
end
to give -characteristics
;; get parameters for the lognormal distribution
set par Mulog m_res std_res
ask patches[
set res exp(random -normal (item 0 par) (item 1 par))
set w ( random -normal mu_mp std_mp )
set sw 0.16
set state 0
set pcolor red
if pycor = 0 [
set res 0
set state 2
set pcolor green
]
]
set current -row patches with [pycor = min -pycor + 1]
ask current -row [set pcolor white]
while [any? current -row with [pcolor = white ]]
[
ask current -row with [pcolor = white] [
let ssw sw
ask patches at -points [ [0 1]]
[
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set sw ssw + w ;; adding productivities
set pcolor white
]
]
;; advance to the next row
ask current -row [set pcolor red]
set current -row patch -set
[patch -at 0 1] of current -row
]
;; going back to the bottom
set current -row patches with [pycor = min -pycor]
ask current -row [
set state 2
set pcolor green
]
ask patches [set sw 0.16 + .002 * (random -normal pycor 1)]
end
to initialize -firms
create -firms nfirms
ask firms[
setxy random -xcor min -pycor
set a 0.16
set k 12.89
set plabel ""
]
end
to update -space
ask patches[
if (res <= 0) and (state = 0) [
set state 1
set pcolor yellow
]
if (any? neighbors with [state = 2]) and (state = 1 )
[
set state 2
set pcolor green
]
]
end
to RD
ask firms[
;; budget for research
let budget max list ( frac_profit * profit) 0
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let bc budget / ((2 + radius) ^ 2)
;; id for the firm
let tempid who
ask patches in -radius radius [
set res res - bc * (random -float 1) ;; update resistance
if (res <= 0) and (state = 0) and (plabel = "")[
ask (
patches in -radius patentbreadth with
[plabel = "" and state = 0]) [
set plabel tempid
set protected patentlife
]
]
]
]
end
to market
ask firms[
set q A * K
]
;; calculate total supply
set qtot sum [q] of firms
;; calculate HHI
set HH 1 / ( sum[(q / qtot) ^ 2] of firms)
set price D / qtot ^ (eta)
ask firms[
set profit (a * price - 0.16) * k
set share q / qtot
set rho price * a / 0.16
let di 1.03 - (2 - share) / (rho * (2 - 2 * share))
set k
k * (( max list (min list di (.8 * profit / k)) 0 ) + 0.97)
]
end
to move1
ask firms [
let tempid who
let cap k
let geto patches in -radius radius with
[ state = 2 and (( plabel = tempid) or (plabel = ""))]
move -to max -one -of geto
[(price * sw )/ (1 + 0.01 * distance firm tempid )]
set a sw
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]
end
to move2
ask firms [
let tempid who
move -to one -of patches in -radius radius with
[ state = 2 and (( plabel = tempid) or (plabel = ""))]
set a sw
]
end
to statistics
let ktot sum [k] of firms
set ave_a (sum [a * k] of firms) / ktot
set max_a max [a] of firms
set min_a min [a] of firms
set max_profit max [profit] of firms
set ave_profit (sum [profit * k] of firms) / ktot
set CS 47 * (ln 2 - ln price)
set FS sum [profit] of firms
set SocW FS + CS
end
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